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My dissertation focuses on the macroeconomics of emerging and developing na-
tions. This group of economies is characterized by significant differences in terms of
institutional quality, financial development, as well as other cultural, social, political
parameters. In turn, these structural heterogeneities exert considerable influence on
their domestic economic environment, specifically impacting key macroeconomic indi-
cators such as output, investment, consumption, foreign capital flows, exchange rates
etc. Understanding these nuanced relationships and analyzing them from various
dimensions has served as the motivation and the foundation of my doctoral research.
The first essay is an empirical and theoretical investigation of Business Cycles and
Macroeconomic Dynamics in post-independence India. India’s growth performance
was touted as ordinary relative to the rest of the world during the first three decades
after it gained independence in 1947. However, path-breaking deregulation and liber-
alization reforms in the 80s and 90s led to substantial growth acceleration and India’s
metamorphosis into a market-based economic system with strong international ties.
This makes the Indian case study really unique and fascinating.
Using annual time series data, we document key business cycle properties of the
Indian economy. Output, consumption and investment are more volatile in India com-
pared to its developed country counterparts. As in developed countries, consumption
is less volatile and investment is more volatile than output in the Indian data. In
contrast, investment is not highly correlated with output in India. Moreover, India’s
economic landscape has undergone significant changes, both in terms of the absolute
level and cyclical fluctuations, across the planning horizon. The presence of structural
break is reported for major macroeconomic variables when we decompose the data
into pre- and post-reform categories. We also test whether a standard real business
cycle (closed economy) model with India-specific parameters can replicate the stylized
features of the business cycle. The model includes a tax on capital income which acts
as a disincentive for future investment, and the results indicate that a high volatility
of the tax shock is required to produce the low investment output correlation. The
model performs reasonably well in matching the correlation dynamics observed in the
data.
In the second essay, I examine Foreign Reserve accumulation in Developing Coun-
tries through the lens of Institutional Quality and Financial Development. In recent
times, several emerging markets have been providing the rest of the world, and espe-
cially the United States, with net resources in the form of current account surpluses.
The most noteworthy aspect of the surge in upstream foreign capital flows has been
the enormous increase in international reserves held by several emerging economies.
Whereas private capital flows are broadly in sync with the standard neoclassical
model, capital outflows from relatively high-productivity emerging markets can be
explained by the accumulation of official reserve assets.
I investigate the foreign reserve dynamics in developing countries; from both an
empirical and theoretical dimension. Using a novel panel dataset combining aspects of
openness, institutional quality, and financial development and an innovative clustering
method; I present a new approach to identify cross-national structural heterogeneity
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and assess its relationship with foreign reserves. I use partition-based cluster analysis
to document underlying reserve dynamics and identify systematic variation across
and between different country groups. The resulting cluster outputs reflect the pres-
ence of cross-national variations in reserve accumulation. Moreover, a series of the
scatter plots encapsulating various dimensions of institutional quality and financial
development points towards the resounding presence of structural heterogeneity in
foreign reserve dynamics in our developing country sample. Cross section and panel
data regressions reinforce the initial hypotheses concerning the role of institutional
and financial development in international reserve dynamics of the developing world.
I also build a theoretical model embedding the key insights from the empirical
analyses in order to propose a coherent framework for explaining the link between
institutions, financial development reserve accumulation. The model underscores the
importance of financial market efficiency and the institutional environment in explain-
ing reserve dynamics of major developing countries. A series of comparative static
exercises shed light on the impact of heterogeneity in institutional parameters and
foreign reserve policy on select macroeconomic variables.
In a nutshell, by going beyond the regional differences, we provide a unique van-
tage point to understand how disparities in institutional and financial conditions
influence reserve dynamics in different country clusters. Our results indicate that in-
come, openness, institutional quality and financial development play an instrumental
role in explaining the underlying patterns of reserves accumulation in the developing
world. However, the effects of these structural indicators are markedly different across
clusters of relatively similar countries in terms of their magnitude as well as direction.
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Chapter 1
Business Cycles and
Macroeconomic Dynamics in India
1.1 Introduction
India is one of the fastest growing emerging economies in the world today; with
an average quarterly GDP growth of 8.1 percent between 2004–2010.1 Interestingly
enough, India’s growth performance was touted as ordinary relative to the rest of the
world during the first three decades after it gained independence in 1947. However,
path-breaking deregulation and liberalization reforms in the 80s and 90s led to sub-
stantial growth acceleration and India’s metamorphosis into a market-based economic
system with strong international ties. This makes the Indian case study really unique
and fascinating, as it depicts an economy that was relatively stagnant, stuck in a
low-level growth trap and stifled by enormous growth blockages, but that managed
to turn it all around in a strikingly short period of time.
1Long time series of seasonally adjusted quarterly data are not produced by the statistical system
in India. For business cycle measurement, the NIPFP-DEA program started computing seasonally
adjusted quarterly GDP data from 1999.
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An understanding of key macroeconomic movements in India is important not only
for designing appropriate domestic stabilization policies, but also for the rest of the
world to evaluate India’s attractiveness as a trading partner and foreign investment
destination. This motivates a systematic inquiry of India’s business cycle.2
The Real Business Cycle (RBC) model is regarded as the workhorse framework
in dynamic macroeconomic research. While RBC models are successfully applied
to developed economies, their ability to replicate the salient features of developing
countries is still being explored. In this paper, we make a two-fold contribution.
On the empirical side, we use annual data and two types of filtering techniques to
document business cycle statistics for the Indian economy.
Our main empirical findings are that output, consumption and investment in India
are more volatile than in developed economies. As in developed countries, consump-
tion is less volatile and investment more volatile than output in the Indian data.
In contrast, investment is not highly correlated with output. Even if we consider
data from the more recent decades following economic liberalization, the correlation
between investment and output in India is much lower than in the US.
As a supplementary quantitative exercise, we conduct a time series exploration
of the Indian economy through the twin lenses of central planning (five year plans)
and economic liberalization initiated in 1991. A structural break is evident for major
macroeconomic variables such as output, consumption, and investment. In addition,
these variables display considerably higher rates of growth and more pronounced
volatility in the post-reform period. The level and growth differentials underscore
the critical impact of economic liberalization and deregulation policies on India’s
economic performance.
2With a labor force of about half a billion, labor market and employment fluctuations are also an
important facet of India’s business cycle. However due to lack of consistent labor market statistics
especially organized employment, hours worked etc., we exclude labor from the current analysis.
Section 1.6 presents a comparison of our benchmark model with its elastic-labor counterpart.
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On the theoretical front, we test whether a standard RBC model (closed economy
framework) driven by a transitory technology shock, a shock to capital income tax,
and parameters calibrated for the Indian economy can replicate the stylized features of
the data. In the model, we assume that the government levies a tax on capital income
to finance its expenditures. With only productivity shocks driving fluctuations, the
model cannot capture the low correlation between investment and output movements.
When there is a positive tax shock (in addition to the standard productivity shock)
and especially if it is likely that there is a high tax rate in subsequent periods, capital
becomes more expensive as the return to capital is reduced and there is less incentive
to invest in future capital. Therefore on impact investment does not respond strongly
to movements in output, leading to a low correlation. Our results suggest that a high
volatility of the tax shock is required to match the low investment-output correlation.
A serious weakness of the closed economy framework is its inability to fully capture
India’s macroeconomic landscape in the last two decades. Far-reaching economic
reforms initiated in 1991 have led to India’s gradual transition towards a small open
economy. This warrants the study of India’s business cycles through the lens of an
open economy model in order to understand the growing importance and contribution
of foreign capital and net exports in the recent times. We take a step in this direction
by extending our benchmark closed economy framework to a small open economy
model (along the lines of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and present some key
results indicative of overall model performance.
Due to the lack of consistent and comparable time series data on labor force and
employment, we abstract from labor movements in the model. To put our results in
perspective, we calibrate the RBC model with labor and without labor movements
for the US, and comment on the bias that results from excluding labor in the analysis
of our benchmark model for India. We find that fixing labor supply at unity leads to
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attenuation of model moments in comparison to the empirical moments.
The focus on business cycle models for emerging economies is relatively recent.
In a seminal paper, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) find that if the technology shock is
appropriately modeled to include transitory and trend components, a standard RBC
model can explain the high volatility of developing country business cycles. Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) evaluate the role played by interest rates in the business cycles of
emerging economies and contrast it with the role played by productivity shocks.
Some authors argue that a standard RBC model might not be the most relevant
theoretical benchmark to study and replicate key business cycle properties of all
developing countries. Bergoeing and Soto (2005) incorporate characteristics of the
Chilean economy in the RBC framework and find that in addition to technology
shocks, fiscal policies and labor market rigidities constitute the main sources of the
business cycle fluctuations.
An integral part of business cycle analysis in India relates to developing leading
and coincident indicators to facilitate forecasting of booms and recessions as well
as dating cycles. Chitre, in a series of studies, presents evidence of synchronous
movements in non-agricultural output, industrial production, capital formation and
other monetary variables. He identifies indicators of growth cycles and characterizes
the Indian economy as experiencing five growth cycles of economic activity during the
period 1951–1975. Dua and Banerji (1999) adopt the NBER business cycle dating
approach and identify six business cycle recessions from 1964–1997, averaging less
than a year. Though there is a history of business cycle research pertaining to India,
it is mainly confined to descriptive investigations.
This paper is most closely related to recent empirical work by Ghate, Pande and
Patnaik (2013), wherein they document stylized facts of India’s business cycles by
investigating the volatility and correlation dynamics of key macroeconomic variables
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when the data is divided into pre- and post-reform samples. Nevertheless, our paper
is significantly different in several aspects.
Our empirical inquiry is based on two critical vantage points namely; the series
of five-year plans (beginning in 1950) as well as the onset of economic reforms in
1991, whereas the work by Ghate et al. focuses specifically on the latter. Moreover,
before presenting a systematic empirical analysis of our key economic variables, we
determine whether Indian economy indeed experienced a structural break sparked by
the economic reforms of 1991. In other words, we test if two distinct trends are present
in the pre- versus post-reform sample. We also compare our key results (volatility
and correlation) against the relevant US data, as a developed country benchmark,
to identify similarities and differences. Most importantly, our paper makes a dual
contribution. We not only present an empirical snapshot of India’s post-independence
macroeconomic environment but also attempt to study if standard theoretical models
of real business cycles, including both closed and small open economy frameworks,
can explain the key empirical regularities pertaining to the Indian economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we discuss the data
and compute the business cycle statistics for the Indian economy. Section 1.3 sheds
light on two empirical experiments performed using the data and outlines the main
observations. Section 1.4 presents the basic RBC model, describes the parameters
used for calibration and discusses estimation of the parameters of the technology pro-
cess. In Section 1.5, we report main results from our models. Section 1.6 analyzes
a model with elastic labor supply to provide a point of comparison with our bench-
mark theoretical framework (assuming inelastic labor supply). Section 1.7 provides
concluding remarks.
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1.2 Business Cycle Statistics for India
1.2.1 Methodology
A serious constraint for business cycle research in India, both empirical and theoret-
ical, is the unavailability of long time-series data at monthly or quarterly frequency
for major macroeconomic variables. We compute the relevant statistics using the
longest annual time-series data. The data on output, consumption (both private and
government) as well as investment (gross capital formation) are extracted from the
Reserve Bank of India for the period 1950–2012.3
We transform the data into log format and employ the technique of Hodrick –
Prescott (HP) filtering to remove the long-run trend and isolate the cyclical compo-
nent of the time series. Given the annual frequency of the data, the value for the
smoothing parameter λ has to be adjusted appropriately. We follow Ravn and Uhlig
(2002) and set λ = 6.25.4 While the value of λ = 1600 has been shown to be a good
approximation for quarterly data, for annual data, there is less agreement in the lit-
erature.5 Hence we also present results using the Band-Pass Filter (BP) based on the
algorithm proposed by Baxter-King (1999). In particular, we employ the specification
BP −K(p, q) where K = 3 (lag length for the moving average), p = 2 (shortest cycle
length) and q = 8 (longest cycle length) with reference to annual data.6 The two
filters provide very similar results for the statistics computed.7
3In the closed economy, GDP is the sum of private consumption and private investment. In case of
the open economy, GDP is composed of private consumption, government consumption, investment
and net exports. See appendix I for the precise accounting definitions used.
4Ravn and Uhlig (2001) provide empirical evidence for the US indicating that the smoothing pa-
rameter should be adjusted using the fourth power of frequency change when moving from quarterly
to annual data. The standard value for λ used at quarterly frequency is 1600, so this adjustment
yields a value of 6.25 for annual data.
5Backus and Kehoe (1992) use λ = 100, while Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1992) and Cooley and
Ohanian (1991) suggest a value of 400 for annual data.
6Dua and Banerji (2001) find that the average length of the business cycle is six years.
7Baxter and King (1999) show that a value of λ close to 10 results in a strong correspondence
between the Hodrick –Prescott and the Bandpass filters.
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1.2.2 Findings
Figure 1.1 shows the cyclical evolution of output, consumption and investment
in India between 1950 and 2012. We observe that several cycles exist with distinct
magnitude and length. Consumption moves closely with output as in developed
countries. As a fraction of GDP, private consumption decreased from around 85
percent in the beginning of the sample to 60 percent at the end. The share of private
investment increased from 8 percent to 25 per cent from 1951 to 2012. This expansion
in investment share is accompanied by greater volatility.
Table 1.1 provides a summary of the business cycle statistics for the Indian econ-
omy. We report three key statistics namely; amplitude of fluctuations or volatility
(percent standard deviation of the cyclical component of each series), volatility rela-
tive to that of output (the ratio of standard deviation of the given series to that of
output) and co-movement (the contemporaneous correlation of the cyclical compo-
nent of a series with that of output).
We can identify some prominent features of India’s business cycle based on Ta-
ble 1.1. In general, consumption (aggregate and private) is less volatile compared
to output. On the contrary, government spending and investment are significantly
more volatile vis-a-vis total output. In particular, private investment is 5.5 times
as volatile as output and displays a particularly weak correlation with output with a
coefficient of 0.24. The majority of the variables seem to have experienced a volatility
moderation in the aftermath of the economic liberalization as reflected in the post-
reform volatility measures. Interestingly enough, while investment volatility is more
or less constant throughout the entire time span, investment-output correlation has
markedly improved in the post-reform era. Also, consumption and investment display
a higher relative volatility (compared to output) in the post-reform period, thus un-
derscoring the fact that output volatility in India has fallen more than proportionately
7
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Figure 1.1: Cyclical Output, Consumption and Investment
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1950–2012 1950–1991 1992–2012
Volatility
GDP 1.74 1.92 1.36
C 1.29 1.37 1.13
I 5.89 5.95 5.91
PC 1.36 1.50 1.06
PI 9.54 10.28 8.02
GC 2.92 3.11 2.55
Relative Volatility
GDP 1.00 1.00 1.00
C 0.74 0.72 0.83
I 3.38 3.10 4.35
PC 0.78 0.78 0.78
PI 5.47 5.35 5.91
GC 1.67 1.62 1.88
Correlation
GDP 1.00 1.00 1.00
C 0.79 0.81 0.74
I 0.29 0.22 0.55
PC 0.80 0.80 0.79
PI 0.24 0.17 0.51
GC 0.18 0.14 0.30
Table 1.1: Business Cycle Statistics: Pre- and Post-Reform India
Note: The first column refers to the full sample period, the second denotes the pre-reform period
and the last column is for the post-reform period. C and I measure aggregate consumption and
gross capital formation respectively. PC and PI refer to private consumption and private investment
(household + corporate) whereas GC measures government consumption expenditure.
compared to its components in the last two decades.
A relevant exercise at this stage would be to compare India’s business cycle statis-
tics to the corresponding values for the US cycle. We calculate the same statistics
using annual data for the US for the similar time period (1950–2012). The data are
extracted from the US National Income and Product Accounts. We use seasonally
adjusted annual time series for personal consumption expenditure and gross private
domestic investment. GDP is the sum of private consumption and private investment
in our benchmark closed economy. On the other hand, when we consider the small
open economy framework, our definition of GDP is extended to include aggregate con-
sumption (private consumption + government consumption), aggregate investment
9
(proxies by gross capital formation) and net exports.8
We compute the statistics using the HP filter.9 All variables in India display higher
volatility compared to the US.10 As in the US, private consumption in India is less
volatile than output.11 Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) find that in emerging markets,
consumption is generally more volatile than output. Only two of the thirteen countries
studied by them show a ratio of consumption to output volatility of less than one.
Private consumption in India is procyclical as in the US with a correlation coefficient
of 0.8. The most striking difference between the stylized facts in India and the US is
that the correlation of (gross private) investment with GDP is 0.87 in the US, while
in India it is a meager 0.24. This significantly low investment-output correlation is
investigated further.
1.2.3 Investment dynamics
As the Indian economy underwent deregulation and liberalization reforms during
the latter half of our sample period; it is instructive to analyze investment data
through distinct time windows and in different sectors. Total investment (Gross
Capital Formation) as a share of GDP jumped from 10 percent in the beginning of
the sample to 36 percent towards the end.12
Decomposing the total investment into that of the household sector, private cor-
8Table 1.11 in appendix I compares key business cycle statistics in India vis-a-vis the US.
9Cooley-Hansen (1981) document the main business cycle statistics in the US using quarterly data
for the time period 1955–1984. Some of the key values reported are as follows: output volatility
(1.74), consumption volatility (0.81), investment volatility (8.45), correlation of consumption with
output (0.65) and correlation of investment with output (0.91).
10Others have documented this fact for developing countries. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) find
that on average emerging market economies have a business cycle twice as volatile as their developed
counterparts.
11This feature is helpful because in the RBC framework, consumption is modeled under the per-
manent income hypothesis. Hence consumption volatility should be smaller than output as agents
try to smooth consumption intertemporally.
12The data for sectoral investment is obtained from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy
published by the Reserve Bank of India.
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porate sector, and the public sector shows that prior to the reforms, the bulk of in-
vestment took place in the public sector (around 45 percent). The share of household
investment in total investment has been steady across the years, ranging between 35-
40 percent. In contrast, the share of corporate investment in total investment, which
was roughly 16 percent till 1991, almost doubled to 31 percent after 1991.
A look at the relative volatility of investment (vis a vis output) shows that govern-
ment investment has remained relatively stable. Investment was mainly undertaken
by the public sector based on five year plans and not by forward-looking private
firms. However, after the economic reforms, entry barriers were eliminated and firms
gained flexibility in making investment decisions. As Shah (2008) points out, in an
environment of greater competition from domestic and foreign firms where profit ex-
pectations drive investment decisions, as well as exposure to financial markets, the
investment by private firms was highly variable.
We take a closer look at the main components of India’s gross investment by exam-
ining them across different time periods (presented in Table 1.2). Corporate invest-
ment in India displays significantly higher volatility (both absolute as well as relative)
compared to the US. Specifically, the volatility of private corporate investment rel-
ative to output was around 10.6 post-1991. Furthermore, while the correlation of
corporate investment to output was very weak (mildly negative) in the early years, it
increased to over 0.4 in the late 70s and 0.6 during the 90s. Nevertheless, comparing
this to the US shows that the correlation of corporate investment with output is still
much smaller over the cycle in India.
Non-residential investment in the US moves very closely with output and the cor-
relation has been increasing over the decades; in the period 1992–2012, the correlation
was 0.91. In addition, the correlation of US private and gross domestic investment
with output since the 1970s has been close to 0.95 and 0.96 respectively. In contrast,
11
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Figure 1.2: Snapshot of India’s Investment Dynamics
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Share HH Corp Pub Total I
1970–1991 7.03 3.53 9.76 20.31
1992–2011 10.73 9.27 8.09 28.59
1970–2011 8.79 6.26 8.96 24.40
1950–1991 6.21 2.95 7.92 17.07
1950–2011 7.67 4.99 7.98 20.89
Relative Volatility HH Corp Pub Total I
1970–1991 4.51 7.63 1.99 2.05
1992–2011 5.81 10.61 3.38 4.32
1970–2011 4.81 8.22 2.36 2.69
1950–1991 4.21 13.05 2.12 2.57
1950–2011 4.41 12.78 2.29 3.61
Correlation HH Corp Pub Total I
1970–1991 0.27 0.42 0.08 0.53
1992–2011 0.03 0.61 0.50 0.63
1970–2011 0.21 0.47 0.21 0.53
1950–1991 0.21 -0.07 0.09 0.23
1950–2011 0.19 -0.01 0.01 0.29
Table 1.2: Sectoral Investment Dynamics: India
Note: The four columns represent household, private corporate, public and total investment (gross
capital formation) respectively. The first panel reports sectoral investments as a share of GDP
(percentage), the second panel depicts the volatility of each investment component relative to output,
and the last panel presents period averages of the investment-output correlation. We HP filter the
data and use the cyclical series to compute volatilities and correlations.
the maximum private investment-output correlation for the Indian economy is still
about 0.6 and observed strictly in the post-reform period. Investment dynamics for
the US economy are presented in Table 1.12 included in appendix I.
1.3 Two Empirical Experiments
“If August 15, 1947 marked the Indian Independence- from political slavery to colonial
power, then I think the August of 1991 could be marked as the beginning of Indian
Economic Freedom”. Dr. Narendra Jadhav13
Two unique features of the Indian economy warrant a systematic empirical inves-
13Dr. Narendra Jadhav currently serves as a member of the Planning Commission of India.
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tigation. First, the use of five year plans as a principal policymaking tool by the
Indian government and second, the defining year 1991, which marked the initiation
of far-reaching economic liberalization in India. We are using the longest available
time series for most of the macroeconomic aggregates, which facilitates a time series
exploration of the economic dynamics in India from these two distinct vantage points.
We start with a brief background to set the stage and motivate our empirical analysis,
which is presented in the following sections.
1.3.1 The History of Five Year Plans in India
India is a force to be reckon with in today’s global economic landscape. The
transition was by no means easy. A series of five year plans laid the policy foundation
and provided a guiding map for operating the economy. Since 1951, the year when
the first five year plan was presented by then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India
has indeed attained several economic milestones. It has taken giant strides and is
considered one of the emerging superpowers today.
During the first three decades since independence (1950–1980), India firmly ad-
hered to the economic strategy of planned growth. This inevitably led to entrepreneurial
abilities of people being closely intertwined with the web of myriad controls, govern-
ment regulations and licenses — so much so that the Indian economy was nicknamed
the “License Raj”.
India’s post-independence economic landscape is primarily based on the concept
of planning, executed through a series of centralized national economic programs,
the Five Year Plans (FYP).14 India is one of the few countries which have still re-
tained the tradition of using five year plans as a primary regulatory and policymaking
14The Soviet Union spearheaded the planning revolution in the 1920s, being the first nation to
implement five year plans under Joseph Stalin’s leadership. This policymaking platform has been
subsequently adopted by the majority of communist economies as well as several capitalist nations.
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mechanism. However, the extent of government involvement and intervention in the
planning process has undergone a marked transition, beginning with a tightly regu-
lated planning philosophy but eventually giving way to a more hands-off approach to
governance termed as ‘Indicative Planning’. Today, the primary focus is to establish a
long-term strategic road map and identify key economic priorities and corresponding
sectoral targets for India.
Economic development has been the underlying theme for each of the twelve five
year plans implemented thus far. However the relative sectoral emphasis has shifted
markedly over time. Agriculture and allied activities were the focal point in the
initial stages of the planning period followed by infrastructure and defense. Over
time, advancement in industrial production and productivity improvement gained
prominence. Economic liberalization and deregulation is the central theme since the
sixth plan (1980 onwards), and has further intensified in the post reform era (1992
onwards).
1.3.2 The Advent of Economic Reforms
India was predominantly insulated from international trade for more than four
decades post-independence. The adoption of an inward-oriented development strategy
coupled with strong resistance towards foreign trade and investment inevitably led to
India’s marginalization in world trade. Moreover, despite the dramatic rise in private
capital flows directed towards developing countries since the mid-eighties, India was
not regarded as a particularly attractive foreign investment destination.
A severe balance of payments crisis surfaced in the Indian economy in 1991, ex-
acerbated by a precarious foreign exchange reserve position. The ensuing period of
economic and political upheaval marked the beginning of significant structural trans-
formation of the Indian economy. Far-reaching economic reforms targeting widespread
15
industry deregulation, privatization and economic liberalization were spearheaded by
then Finance Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh. The subsequent transition of India
from a heavily regulated economy to a dynamic market economy has indeed been
remarkable. Therefore it would not be appropriate to view the economy pre- and
post-1991 from the same vantage point.
India was indeed a late entrant in the reforms arena, embarking on the journey
with full steam only in 1991.15 However the strong need of a paradigm shift was felt
much earlier, as many of India’s counterparts in East Asia achieved the twin goals of
sustained high growth and drastic poverty reduction through outward-oriented export
promotion policies and strengthening the private sector. The Indian government did
introduce some key policy initiatives targeting widespread industrial development and
privatization in the 1980s. But it was not until 1991 that a systemic transition to
a more open economy with greater market reliance, a dominant private sector, and
economy-wide institutional restructuring was truly underway. In particular, reforms
of the 1990s were regarded as ‘pro-market’ in orientation as against the largely ‘pro-
business’ reforms of the 1980s (Kohli, 2005 and Rodrik et al, 2005).
A hallmark of India’s reform agenda, in comparison to its East Asian and other
developing world counterparts, is the emphasis on evolutionary transition rather than
rapid restructuring akin to ‘shock therapy’. Gradualism was the natural byproduct
of India’s parliamentary democracy and a pluralistic political environment where eco-
nomic reforms can be successfully implemented only if a sufficiently broad consensus
can be formed. The favorable economic experience in the 1980s created an intellectual
climate for following the same road map, with the 1991 crisis solidifying the need for
even more aggressive reforms. This being said, the pace of reforms had to be attuned
to India’s democratic polity.
15This economic scenario is succinctly described by Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman of
Planning Commission of India in his article ‘Economic Reforms in India since 1991: Has Gradualism
Worked?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, summer 2002.
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Figure 1.3: India Shining
Note: The vertical bar in all four panels corresponds to year 1991, when India’s economic reforms
kick started.
Two critical dimensions of India’s economic reform stand out namely; macroeco-
nomic stabilization and structural adjustment. Furthermore, structural adjustment
consists of Liberalization, Privatization, and Globalization: LPG, a hallmark phrase
often used with reference to India’s economic reforms.
Has India changed post-reform? Saying ‘significantly’ would be a mild response.
Since 1991, India’s GDP has quadrupled, its foreign exchange reserves have skyrock-
eted from 5.8 billion to 279 billion dollars, and exports have jumped from 18 billion
to 178 billion dollars (See Figure 1.3). Most now view India as a global service hub
specializing in business process outsourcing, data base production, financial account-
ing, medical transcription, etc. However, there is a wide spectrum of services and
industries wherein India is making major breakthroughs.
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In a nutshell, whereas the pre-reform India resembles a heavily planned (closed)
economy with government dominance, the post-reform India shares many features
of a free market (open) economy. A vibrant service sector, steadily rising foreign
capital flows (particularly foreign direct investment) and sustained foreign reserve
accumulation are some of the hallmarks of the Indian economy in recent decades.
The long annual time series data for the Indian economy (1950 onwards) can be
recast into a series of systematically designed and implemented five year plans. This
provides an ideal setting to study the evolution of key macroeconomic aggregates over
the entire planning period and identify the underlying trends and patterns.
Our sample covers a total of eleven five year plans. Plans one through seven were
administered prior to the reforms and plans eight through eleven were implemented
after the reforms.16 This establishes a direct correspondence between the two empir-
ical strategies used in our analyses.
1.3.3 Empirical Analyses of Planning and Economic Reforms
Before delving into the business cycle properties of Indian economy in the post
liberalization era, it seems necessary to conduct a simple thought experiment. We
divide the entire dataset into the pre-reform (1950–1991) and post reform (1992–
2012) periods. The question is if the Indian economy was different in these two
periods. And if so, how significant was the transformation? In other words, we need to
understand whether the magnitudes (means) and volatilities (standard deviations) of
key macroeconomic variables such as output, consumption (both private and public),
investment, etc. were strikingly different before and after economic liberalization.
Table 1.3 below clearly answers our first question with a resounding yes. Even the
16The twelfth five year plan is currently underway. Note that three years in our sample period
(1967, 1968 and 1991) are excluded from the planning coverage since extraordinary circumstance
compelled the Indian government to special annual plans.
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crudest indicator, period averages, reflects critical differences in the Indian economy
before and after the economic reforms. All the major macroeconomic aggregates have
risen dramatically in the last two decades. Despite a cautious growth outlook, high
inflation rate and a few setbacks in the wake of the current global financial crisis,
many economic variables seem to be maintaining their positive trajectories. This
constitutes initial supporting evidence for the occurrence of structural transforma-
tion in India.17
Time Period Y C I PC GC NX
Pre-Reform 7138.36 6034.21 1399.49 5308.17 726.03 -102.01
Post-Reform 30895.37 22274.70 9138.59 18735.76 3538.94 -1326.17
Table 1.3: India’s Economic Transition
Note: Values represent average levels of select economic aggregates for the pre-reform (1950–1991)
and post-reform (1992–2012) periods. All variables are real and expressed in billions of rupees (base
year 2004-05).
Next we take a closer look at the two sub-samples to determine whether these
differences stem from two distinct underlying growth trends.
All the major macroeconomic time series included in our empirical analyses (e.g.
GDP, Consumption, Investment and Net Exports) report the presence of a trend
break.18 In other words, there seem to be two distinct trends: one prior to the
reforms (pre-1991) and the other after the initiation of reforms (post-1991).
The combined impact of reform and year (captured by the interaction term in the
individual regression models) is indicative of a structural break in the post-reform
Indian economy. This effect is significant for most of the variables of interest such
17Behavior of investment and net exports is markedly different in the pre and post-reform pe-
riod.This is indicative of significant shifts in the relationship between savings and investment in
India.
18A strong presence of heteroskedasticity is observed across the board when we divide the data
according to five year plans (finer disaggregation) or a single reform dummy (generic disaggregation).
We employ the ROBVAR routine in Stata to detect and test group-wise heteroskedasticity. Table
1.13 in appendix I summarizes the distribution of residual volatilities for key macro variables.
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as gross domestic product (GDP), aggregate consumption (C) private final consump-
tion (PC), government consumption (GC), two alternative measures of investment
namely; gross capital formation (I) and gross domestic capital formation (I2) and
finally measures of private investment (PI) and private output (PY). In particular,
GDP is significantly more volatile post-reform (with a big jump from plan 6 to plan
7 in particular). Specifically, aggregate output is almost three times as volatile in
the post-reform period (when we condense the individual five year plan (FYPLAN)
dummies into a single binary REFORM variable). Aggregate consumption volatility
increased more than threefold from the pre-reform to the post-reform period. When
inspected by individual planning period, a dramatic increase in consumption volatility
occurred between plan 7 and 8 (containing the year 1991, when reforms kick in).
In order to understand whether the aggregate consumption dynamics are driven
by the private or public sector, we decompose total consumption into private and
government consumption respectively. Private consumption mimics the behavior of
aggregate consumption and actually magnifies the trend-break and volatility effect.
The relative volatility of private consumption post reform is at least 3.5 times that of
its pre-reform threshold. Actual values corresponding to plan 7 and 8 reiterate this
point. Government consumption also is considerably more volatile in the post-reform
era but the absolute magnitudes of volatilities are somewhat tepid compared to their
private counterparts.
Post-reform investment volatility (measured by Gross Capital Formation) is more
than eight times its pre-reform level. This is indicative of pronounced fluctuations
in investment as a by-product of economic liberalization. The strongest evidence of
trend break and correspondingly the most acute volatility differential is reflected in
the net exports series. Net exports volatility post reform is almost 10 times that of
its pre-reform level. However, there is an important caveat here. One should note
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that since India resembled a heavily regulated economy prior to 1991, the magnitude
and fluctuations in net exports are naturally more pronounced (dramatic) post-1991.
Thus the post-reform period seems the most relevant for further empirical and policy
directive.19 A number of external sector reforms have been implemented since 1991,
such as currency devaluation, abolition of import licensing, a drastic reduction in
tariff rates, the gradual removal of quantitative restrictions on imports, and foreign
investment liberalization. These policies have been instrumental in shaping India’s
international trade and investment landscape in the recent times.
In addition to the level variables, we also calculate several key ratios using our
data (e.g.consumption to output, investment to output etc.) Government consump-
tion to GDP and investment to GDP ratios depict existence of trend breaks (actual
ratio coefficients are relatively small in magnitude compared to the respective levels).
Investment to output ratio is twice as volatile post-reform, thus confirming existence
of absolute as well as relative volatility.
Annual Growth rates for key macroeconomic variables provide another line of
support to our story of structural transformation. Table 1.14 in appendix I depicts
the evolution of GDP and consumption growth rates, reinforcing the fact that the
trend growth exhibits a general upswing. In particular, average GDP growth was 4.1
percent and 6.8 percent in the pre- and post-reform period, respectively. Moreover,
output growth has accelerated steadily throughout the planning period, recording a
3.9 percent average in the first five year plan and almost doubling to 7.67 percent in
the tenth plan. Total consumption growth has similarly galloped from 3.8 percent to
6.05 percent between the pre- and post-reform periods.
Table 1.4 below provides another dimension of the growth rate differential. We
19After the demise of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971, India’s exchange
rate policies led to significant depreciation of the rupee. Supplemented by active export promo-
tion, this favorable exchange rate environment paved way for Indian export growth to gain some
momentum in the early 80s, with further acceleration witnessed after the economic reforms.
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divide the entire dataset into decades to supplement our original pre-post reform
classification. Next we compute cumulative annual growth rates for each of the sub-
periods. Inspection of the entries in each column is indicative of a general upward
growth trajectory through the decades. Moreover, when we focus on the last two rows
of the table, covering the pre- and post-reform periods, the evidence is even stronger.
The growth gap for net exports is the most striking, due to dramatic increase in
trade deficit after liberalization led- trade openness. This acceleration in the volume
of trade deficit is depicted in Figure 1.4 below.
Time Period Y C PC GC I NX
1950–1959 3.86 3.64 3.66 3.34 4.39
1960–1969 3.85 3.41 2.88 9.16 5.59
1970–1979 2.60 2.91 2.70 4.47 5.03
1980–1989 5.56 4.61 4.20 7.17 6.74
1990–1999 5.73 5.06 4.80 6.39 7.08
2000–2012 7.39 6.66 6.76 6.17 11.33
1950–1991 4.06 3.78 3.55 5.82 4.96 1.30
1992–2012 6.86 6.18 6.12 6.43 9.40 17.46
Table 1.4: Macroeconomic Snapshot of India: Compound Annual Growth Rates
Note: The last two rows present pre-reform and post-reform values respectively. Analysis of India’s
Net Exports seems to be more relevant and meaningful in the post-reform period based on their
magnitude and volatility. Therefore, we have chosen not to report decade-wise growth numbers.
To shed light on the post-reform evolution of net exports, we created another
classification scheme for our sample using the variable ‘reformnew’.20 The bottom
panel in Figure 1.4 presents net export dynamics for the specific time periods as
defined by this new variable. We can clearly see successive deterioration in India’s
trade balance from point one through four (corresponding to the post-reform five year
plans).
How the key components of India’s gross domestic product have evolved in the post-
20Keeping in mind the correspondence between five year plans and the reform break, the variable
’reformnew’ integrates our two empirical approaches. All the five year plans prior to reforms (one
through seven) are treated as the reference category 0 and each of the post-reform five year plans
are treated separately.
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Figure 1.4: India’s Net Exports
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independence era is another interesting question to analyze. A noteworthy feature
of the Indian economy is the secular decline in the share of consumption to output,
accompanied by a sustained rise in the investment share as depicted in the top panel
of Figure 1.5 below. This underlines the changing importance of private consumption
and investment as twin engines of economic growth in the recent times. In particular,
the share of investment seems to have picked up from the seventh plan onwards,
triggered by the abolition of License Raj initiation of industrial deregulation and
the initial wave of privatization. The share of government consumption appears to be
remarkably stable and relatively small over the last six decades, indicating a relatively
small role of the public sector [see the bottom panel of Figure 1.5].
Net exports in India warrant a special treatment since their magnitude and rel-
evance is limited to the post-reform period of trade openness. It is clear from the
bottom panel in Figure 1.4 below that despite the burgeoning trade deficit since the
mid-90s; net exports continue to be a very small component of India’s GDP.
Next we consider the two broad categories comprising aggregate investment namely;
private (household + corporate) and public investment and inspect their respective
shares in total output across the entire sample period. As reflected in Figure 1.6 be-
low, the private investment to output ratio in India is on a steady upward path since
the mid-80s. This is mirrored in the steady decline in public investment share during
the same time. Lastly, we focus on the narrow measure of output, which is the sum
of private consumption and private investment. The share of private consumption
in private output has experienced a secular fall coupled with a concomitant six-fold
rise in the share of private investment. This reinforces the argument that the Indian
economy is indeed undergoing a structural transformation. In other words, consump-
tion dominance in India is being challenged by the emergence of private investment
as a strong growth driver in the post-reform era.
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1.4 Model
1.4.1 Closed Economy Framework- Theoretical Benchmark
In this section we present the standard real business cycle model that incorporates
a productivity shock and as fiscal shock. The economy consists of a representative
household that has preferences over the sequence of consumption Ct described by
Ut = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1−γt
1− γ (1.4.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time discount factor and 1/γ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
The budget constraint is given by
Ct +Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 = rtKt + wt + Tt − τt(rt − δ)Kt (1.4.2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of depreciation and Ct ≥ 0. rt and wt denote the rental
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rate of capital and wages respectively. We assume that in every period, agents supply
one unit of labor inelastically. The government levies a tax on capital income (τt)
and redistributes the tax revenue as a lump sum transfer (Tt) to the households. The
tax allows a depreciation deduction.
The government balances its budget every period, which indicates that total rev-
enue generated by the capital income tax is equal to the total transfer payments made
by the government.
Tt = τt(rt − δ)Kt (1.4.3)
The representative firm faces the standard profit maximization problem and pro-
duces output Yt using capital Kt according to the Cobb-Douglas production function,
Yt = AtK
1−α
t (µ)
α (1.4.4)
where 1− α is the share of capital in production and µt represents the deterministic
trend. Therefore, the equations for returns to factors of production are given by:
rt = (1− α) Yt
Kt
(1.4.5)
wt = αYt (1.4.6)
The transitory productivity shock as well as the fiscal shock (specifically, shock to
capital income tax) is assumed to follow an AR (1) process in logs:
logAt+1 = ρa logAt + 
a
t+1. (1.4.7)
log τt+1 = ρτ log τt + 
τ
t+1. (1.4.8)
A competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of stochastic processes for At and τt as
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well as quantities Ct and Kt that solves the consumer’s and firm’s decision problems.
Choice of Parameter Values
We use the model equations and the relevant data series to calibrate the key
parameters of the model which are:
β: The Euler condition for consumption yields β = 1
1+r
. The annualized average
of the real interest rate in India is roughly 2 percent, resulting in a value for β = 0.98.
δ: The capital stock series for India is obtained using the standard perpetual
inventory method. The depreciation rate is computed by regressing the depreciation
series on the capital stock resulting δ = 4.5 percent. This is close to the value for
depreciation rate assumed in the literature using annual data for India (Virmani,
2004), which is about 5 percent.
α: For the share of capital, we follow Virmani (2004) and set 1− α = 0.3.
γ: We follow the literature and set the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution,
γ = 2.
ρa and σa: We use two procedures to determine the parameters of the technology
process. One, we follow NIPFP that uses the accounting method of Verma (2010)
and extends the dataset to 2008 to compute the TFP series. They estimate the
parameters of an AR (1) process as 0.92 and 0.005 respectively for persistence and
standard deviation respectively.
In addition, we estimate the parameters governing the amplitude and persistence
of the technology shock process in a basic model. In particular, we estimate ρa and σa
by applying the generalized method of moments (GMM) using annual data on output,
consumption and investment from India. We follow Cicco-Garcia, Pancrazi and Uribe
(2009) and include 11 moment conditions: the standard deviations of detrended out-
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put, consumption and investment, the correlation of output with consumption and
investment and the first and second order autocorrelations of output, consumption
and investment. The estimated parameter values are 0.9 and 0.05.
The parameters are listed in Table 1.5 below.
ρτ and στ : We vary the parameters for the persistence and standard deviation of
the shock process and report the investment output correlation statistic in Table 1.6.
Parameter Value
1− α 0.3
β 0.98
δ 0.05
γ 2
ρz 0.92
σz 0.005
Table 1.5: Parameters: Closed Economy
ρτ
0.5 0.9
Std dev 0.01 0.88 0.87
0.1 0.87 0.58
Table 1.6: Correlation between output and investment
1.4.2 Results and Discussion
Table 1.7 below reports the moments from the model and compares it to the ac-
tual data moments calculated earlier. The values of the parameters for the tax shock
process are chosen so as to match the investment-output correlation in the data (i.e.
around 0.5). We then check whether the tax series exhibits these properties.
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Data Model
Volatility
GDP 1.8 1.8
PC 1.4 2.8
PI 9.5 4.3
Relative Volatility
GDP 1.0 1.0
PC 0.8 1.5
PI 5.3 2.4
Correlation
GDP 1.0 1.0
PC 0.7 0.5
PI 0.6 0.6
Table 1.7: Business Cycle Statistics: Data and Model
Note: GDP = Private Output = Private Consumption (PC) + Private Investment (PI). In our
benchmark closed economy framework, we focus exclusively on private components of C, I and Y .
We use two data series to describe the tax on capital income. In the first, we take
the corporate tax reported by about 6500 companies listed on the Stock Exchanges
in India for the years 1995–2010. This is divided by profits before tax to obtain the
effective tax rate.21 An AR (1) model is fitted to this data after detrending to obtain
the persistence and standard deviation as 0.6 and 0.31 respectively.
The second series is corporation tax (in rupee crore) from 1951–2008, obtained
from the Reserve Bank of India. Since we do not have a series for capital income, we
assume that the share of capital income in total income (GDP) is 0.3 and use this to
divide the tax series and obtain the tax rate. The persistence and standard deviation
for the corresponding AR (1) model are 0.76 and 0.12 respectively.
In the model we assume that there is no correlation between the productivity shock
and tax shock, to obtain a low correlation between output and investment. In order
to check whether this is true in the data, we compute the correlations of the tax series
with output, consumption and investment and compare them to results obtained from
21The data is obtained from Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy.
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the model.22 The first series, based on company data, does a better job of matching
the moments of the data. However, the sign for the output-tax correlation is opposite
in the model and the data.
In general, the tax series shows high volatility and persistence as required in the
model. With regards to correlation, we obtain mixed results.
1.5 Small Open Economy Extension
1.5.1 Baseline Model
In this section we extend our benchmark closed economy and present a small open
economy model along the lines of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). The canonical
small open economy model is plagued with a serious unit root problem concerning
net foreign assets. This implies that purely transitory exogenous disturbances tend to
have minor effects on current consumption but permanent effects on the net foreign
asset position.
In their seminal paper, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe propose five alternative theo-
retical constructs to circumvent the unit root issue. They also argue that the choice
amongst these competing approaches depends purely on the research inquiry and com-
putational convenience since their qualitative predictions do not vary much. Here we
use a convex cost of portfolio adjustment (period asset holdings different from some
long-run level) as a mechanism to pin down the steady state net foreign asset position
and thereby ensure model stationarity.23
22Since DSGE models have been tested mainly for their ability to match second moments of the
data, we compute the correlations of tax series with other macroeconomic variables and do not
estimate the nature of the shocks.
23The baseline model is identical across all five approaches. The critical difference lies in the
nature of household budget constraints and the corresponding optimization conditions.
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The economy consists of a representative household that has preferences over the
sequence of consumption Ct described by
Ut = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
[Ct − ω−1hωt ]1− γ
1− γ − 1 (1.5.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time discount factor, ω measures Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, and 1/γ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The budget constraint is given by
dt = (1 + rt−1)dt−1 − Yt + Ct + It + Φ(Kt+1 −Kt) + ψ
2
(dt − d)2 (1.5.2)
Where dt denotes household borrowing (debt), Yt is aggregate output, Ct is private
consumption and It is total investment. ψ and d are constants governing the portfolio
adjustment costs. Lastly, Φ(x) refers to quadratic capital adjustment cost denoted
by:
Φ(X) =
φ
2
X2 (1.5.3)
We can rearrange the household budget constraint to reflect the components of
aggregate output (national income) in this economy.
Yt = Ct + It + Φ(Kt+1 −Kt) + ψ
2
(dt − d)2 + (1 + rt−1)dt−1 − dt (1.5.4)
where the last two terms on the right hand side represent the trade balance. Thus, ag-
gregate output can be decomposed into consumption, investment, capital adjustment
costs, portfolio adjustment costs and trade balance.
Output Yt is produced using capital Kt and labor ht according to the standard
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Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = AtK
α
t h
1−α
t (1.5.5)
Where α denotes the share of capital in production.
Capital stock evolves according to the following process:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (1.5.6)
Lastly, prevailing domestic interest rate (rate at which households borrow from the
rest of the world) equals the world interest rate, as a small open economy takes the
world interest rate as given.
rt = r∗ (1.5.7)
The transitory productivity (TFP) shock is assumed to follow an AR (1) process
in logs:
logAt+1 = ρa logAt + 
a
t+1. (1.5.8)
We retain the original parameter values used by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe.
Parameter Value
α 0.32
r 0.04
δ 0.1
γ 2
ω 1.455
φ 0.028
ψ 0.00074
d 0.7442
ρa 0.42
σ 0.01
Table 1.8: Parameters: Open Economy
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1.5.2 Open Economy: Discussion
Comparing the model moments with the data moments (computed earlier) at a
glance leads to a few key insights. The benchmark small open economy model overes-
timates the volatilities of output, consumption and investment. However, the model
seems to perform reasonably well in matching relative volatility of consumption (vis
a vis output) as well as the correlations of private consumption and investment with
output, when we focus exclusively on the post-reform period. Note that the model
parameters are calibrated for the Canadian economy (as in Mendoza). This, coupled
with the data deficiency to accurately calibrate all of India-specific parameters can
partly explain this discrepancy.24 It remains to be seen how the model performs under
various parameter combinations so that we are able to draw appropriate qualitative
inferences and quantitative predictions.
1.6 Comment on excluding labor from the model
Due to the lack of reliable and consistent data on employment, work hours, and
wages, we assume that labor is inelastically supplied in the model. This means that
we are abstracting from the choice between consumption and leisure that agents make
when they face aggregate shocks. This could bias the results of the moments based
on the current model. We try to understand the direction and extent of the bias by
calibrating a model with variable labor and with fixed labor (one unit inelastically
supplied) for US parameters and comparing the two sets of moments.
In the first model, the economy consists of a representative household that has
24The Indian economy most closely resembles a small open economy only in the post-reform period,
which corresponds to the last two decades in our sample.
34
preferences over the sequence of consumption Ct described by
Ut = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1−γt
1− γ (1.6.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time discount factor and γ represents the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution.
The budget constraint is given by
Ct +Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 = Yt (1.6.2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of depreciation. Output is produced using capital according
to a Cobb-Douglas production function,
Yt = (zt)
αK1−αt (1.6.3)
where zt is the technology shock which follows an AR (1) process.
Agent’s preference over consumption and labor in the second model is given by
Ut = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1−γt
1− γ − η
l1+φt
1 + φ
(1.6.4)
where 1
φ
is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and η is the share of labor in utility.
The production function is
Yt = (ztLt)
αK1−αt (1.6.5)
The parameters used in the calibration are given in the table below.
The model moments reported for output, consumption and investment are the
standard deviation, the standard deviation relative to that of output and the con-
temporaneous correlation with output.
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Parameter Value
α 0.68
β 0.98
δ 0.05
γ 2
η 0.3
φ 3
ρz 0.9
σz 0.01
Table 1.9: Parameters
Model with L Model with L = 1
Volatility
Y 0.059 0.047
C 0.051 0.039
I 0.097 0.077
Relative volatility
Y 1.00 1.00
C 0.86 0.83
I 1.64 1.97
Correlation
Y 1.00 1.00
C 0.99 0.98
I 0.96 0.96
Table 1.10: Moments from the Model
The results show that with inelastic labor, the volatility of output, consumption
and investment are reduced. For example, in terms of moments, the standard devia-
tion of output falls from 5.9 percent to 4.7 percent when the labor supply elasticity
goes from 0.3 to zero. In a model with elastic labor, both the substitution and in-
come effects of a wage change play a role in adjusting consumption, as the agent
can choose between consumption and leisure. Flexible labor supply thus provides an
extra margin of adjustment when analyzing the dynamic response of key macroeco-
nomic variables to a productivity shock. In this case, the variation in output due to
a transitory technology shock can be decomposed into variation in labor supply and
changes in capital stock, which are of relatively smaller magnitude in the short run.
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However, when the labor supply is fixed, we shut down the first channel thereby
dampening the overall effect and reducing output volatility. King and Rebelo (1999)
also show a reduction in the standard deviation of output and labor when the elasticity
is reduced. Thus we can conclude that the results obtained in our benchmark model,
when labor supply is assumed to be inelastic, underestimate the volatilities.
1.7 Conclusion
We document the main stylized facts of India’s business cycles using longest avail-
able annual data. A key feature is that in India, investment and output are not highly
correlated over the cycle; in contrast to what we see in developed countries.
In addition, we undertake two distinct empirical inquiries using our annual time
series data. First, we investigate macroeconomic scenarios in India across various
planning periods and second, we determine whether the economic reforms initiated
in the year 1991 led to significant structural transformation in the Indian economy.
Our analysis strongly supports the existence of a trend break (in the pre- versus post-
reform India) based on strikingly different levels, growth rates as well as volatilities of
key macro variables. We then proceed to test whether a simple business cycle model
with technology and fiscal shocks can replicate the key stylized features of India’s
business cycles. Our results show that a high volatility of the tax rate shock is required
to produce the low investment output correlation. With due acknowledgment of the
tax data limitations, we use the available data and find a high volatility. The model
seems to perform reasonably well in matching the correlation dynamics observed in
the data. We also observe that by excluding labor movements from the model, our
results underestimate the true volatilities of the specific macro variables.
Extensions to the model include introduction of a government sector that consumes
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and invests as well as experimenting with alternative small open economy frameworks
to identify which features specific to the Indian economy are critical in order to best
capture its business cycle fluctuations.
India has indeed traveled a long way from being a highly regulated closed economy
in the post-independence era to a vibrant emerging market of the current times.
One must however keep in mind that India’s reform journey is far from complete
and the path is beset with challenges and obstacles. The Indian government ought
to continuously identify and manage socioeconomic and sectoral problem areas to
sustain and strengthen the pace of reforms.
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1.8 Appendix I
Aggregate output (GDP) = Private Consumption (PC) + Government
Consumption (GC) + Gross Capital Formation (I) + Net Exports (NX)
Y = C + I +NX (1.8.1)
Note that in the Closed Economy version we assume NX = 0 and specifically focus
on private consumption and private investment respectively.
Aggregate Consumption (C) = Private Consumption (PC) + Govern-
ment Consumption (GC)
C = PC +GC (1.8.2)
Private output (PY) = Private Consumption (PC) + Private Investment (PI)
PY = PC + PI (1.8.3)
Gross Capital Formation by Sector :
Gross Capital Formation (GCF) = Household Investment (HH) + Private Corpo-
rate Investment (Corp) + Public Investment (Public)
Gross Capital Formation (GCF) = Gross Fixed Capital Formation + Change in
Inventories.
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Data (HP) USA (HP)
Volatility
GDP 1.74 1.41
C 1.29 1.16
I 9.54 6.08
PC 1.36 1.13
GC 2.92 3.02
Relative Volatility
GDP 1.00 1.00
C 0.74 0.82
I 5.47 4.31
PC 0.78 0.80
GC 1.67 2.14
Correlation
GDP 1.00 1.00
C 0.79 0.72
I 0.24 0.87
PC 0.80 0.83
GC 0.18 0.14
Table 1.11: Business Cycle Statistics - India vs. USA
Share Res NonRes PriI Total I
1970–1991 5.8 8.6 14.0 18.4
1992–2012 4.6 11.5 16.5 20.7
1970–2012 5.2 10.0 15.2 19.5
Relative Volatility Res NonRes PriI Total I
1970–1991 6.81 2.63 4.27 3.43
1992–2012 6.88 4.29 5.33 4.04
1970–2012 6.83 3.17 4.59 3.61
Correlation Res NonRes PriI Total I
1970–1991 0.79 0.85 0.94 0.96
1992–2012 0.68 0.91 0.95 0.96
1970–2012 0.76 0.85 0.94 0.96
Table 1.12: Disaggregated Investment Dynamics: US
Note: The four columns represent residential, non-residential, private and gross domestic investment
respectively. The idea is to depict the best possible correspondence between aggregate and sector
wise investment statistics reported in India and the US.
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Time Period Y C I PC GC NX
FYP1 266.81 216.44 93.29 153.66 64.25
FYP2 252.39 184.36 109.29 141.92 49.72
FYP3 224.73 126.86 23.24 134.90 17.06
FYP4 304.08 191.63 60.25 169.13 29.85
FYP5 275.20 161.12 118.61 157.94 14.90
FYP6 286.71 199.45 101.97 168.73 42.19
FYP7 887.24 492.76 270.03 395.55 104.91
FYP8 1902.60 1382.06 1209.28 1117.07 266.61
FYP9 1571.59 1028.03 987.89 899.52 160.49
FYP10 658.93 382.88 1334.71 308.52 144.88
FYP11 2169.70 1745.48 1167.54 1396.15 364.13
Pvalue 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pre-Reform 561.53 371.01 199.27 296.69 79.74 93.07
Post-Reform 1575.34 1176.60 1108.96 957.99 238.15 928.30
Pvalue 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 1.13: Macroeconomic Volatility by Plan and Reform
Note: Values represent residual (error) Volatilities based on Stata’s ROBVAR routine in order to
check presence of group wise Heteroskedasticity in our macroeconomic time series. The p-values
indicate the significance of relevant F statistic thus reflecting strong presence of Heteroskedasticity
across various five year plans and also in the pre- and post-reform era.
Time Period Ygr Cgr Igr C/Y I/Y PC/Y GC/Y
FYP1 3.96 3.93 4.02 91.69 13.08 86.06 5.63
FYP2 4.14 3.83 7.79 88.20 16.33 82.38 5.82
FYP3 3.49 3.38 7.94 86.11 19.00 78.42 7.69
FYP4 3.22 2.81 3.77 84.66 19.42 74.76 9.90
FYP5 3.29 3.48 5.37 82.78 20.60 72.70 10.09
FYP6 5.47 5.13 5.55 85.51 21.91 74.32 11.18
FYP7 5.85 4.78 7.65 82.26 23.21 69.68 12.58
FYP8 6.40 5.05 6.98 76.58 23.02 64.94 11.65
FYP9 5.52 5.42 9.92 75.22 25.33 62.66 12.56
FYP10 7.65 5.84 15.58 70.84 31.13 59.75 11.08
FYP11 7.05 7.60 8.50 70.19 38.59 59.12 11.08
Pre-Reform 4.11 3.81 5.35 85.78 19.27 76.88 9.10
Post-Reform 6.67 6.05 10.16 73.07 29.95 61.50 11.57
Table 1.14: Predicted Values based on Five Year Plans and Reforms
Note: Values are marginal predictions based on linear regressions involving five year plan and reform
dummies.
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1.9 Appendix II
1.9.1 Model solution: Closed Economy
Optimality conditions of the Household’s problem
Assuming that the variables grow at the constant rate µ, we make the variables
stationary. Define yt = Yt/Xt−1, ct = Ct/Xt−1, kt = Kt/Xt−1, it = It/Xt−1, and
trt = Tt/Xt−1. Thus the constraints and the first order conditions are:
yt = Atk
1−α
t µ
α (1.9.1)
µkt+1 − (1− δ)kt = rtkt + wt + trt − τt(rt − δ)kt − ct (1.9.2)
trt = τt(rt − δ)kt (1.9.3)
(
µ
ct
)γ = βEt
1
cγt+1
[rt+1 − τt+1(rt+1 − δ) + 1− δ] (1.9.4)
Steady State
y
k
=
1
(1− α)(1− τ)(
µγ
β
− δ(τ − 1)− 1) (1.9.5)
k = µ(
y
k
)−1/α (1.9.6)
c
k
= (1− τ(1− α))y
k
+
tr
k
+ δ(τ − 1)− µ+ 1 (1.9.7)
tr
k
= τ(1− α)y
k
− δτ (1.9.8)
i
k
= µ− 1 + δ (1.9.9)
Log-linearized Model
0 = −yˆt + (1− α) ˆkt−1 + aˆt (1.9.10)
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0 = − c
k
cˆt − i
k
iˆt + α
y
k
yˆt + δ ˆkt−1 + (δ + (1− α)y
k
)τˆt +
tr
k
ˆtrt (1.9.11)
0 = (1− α)y
k
yˆt − δ ˆkt−1 − tr
k
ˆtrt + ((1− α)y
k
− δ)τˆt (1.9.12)
0 = µkˆt − (1− δ) ˆkt−1 − i
k
iˆt (1.9.13)
0 = Et[ ˆct+1 − cˆt − σα(1− α)y
k
( ˆat+1 − kˆt)] (1.9.14)
1.9.2 Model Solution: Open Economy
First Order Conditions associated with Ct ht Kt and dt
[Ct − ω−1hωt ]−γ = λt (1.9.15)
[Ct − ω−1hωt ]−γhω−1t = (1− α)
λtYt
ht
(1.9.16)
Substituting the expression for λ we have:
hω−1t = (1− α)
Yt
ht
(1.9.17)
λt[1 + φ(Kt+1 −Kt)] = βEtλt+1[α Yt+1
Kt+1
+ 1− δ + φ(Kt+2 −Kt+1)] (1.9.18)
λt[1− ψ(dt − dt)] = β(1 + rt)Etλt+1 (1.9.19)
The final optimality condition depicts the equality between marginal benefit of
borrowing an extra unit of debt against its marginal cost. If the household chooses
to borrow an additional unit, its current consumption increases by one unit minus
the marginal cost of portfolio adjustment ψ(dt − dt). The left hand side of the above
equation reflects the value of this consumption increase in utility terms. Next period,
the household must repay this additional unit of debt with interest (1 + rt). The
burden of debt repayment in terms of today’s utility sacrifice is given by the right-
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hand side.
The four first order (optimality) conditions outlined above along with aggregate
production function, law of motion for capital, equation determining domestic interest
rate and the resource constraint constitute the system of 8 equations in 8 unknowns
λt Yt Ct, Kt, It, ht, dt, and at. We obtain the model solution by solving this system
of equations.
Steady State
Is = δKs (1.9.20)
ds = (1 + r)ds + Ys + Cs + Is (1.9.21)
Ys = rds + Cs + Is (1.9.22)
Cs = Ys − Is − rds (1.9.23)
hω = (1− α)Y (1.9.24)
h1−α = [[(1− α)Y ]1/ω]1−α (1.9.25)
Y
K
= [
h
K
]1−α =
r + δ
α
(1.9.26)
h
K
= [
r + δ
α
]
1
1−α (1.9.27)
Y
h
= [
h
K
]−α (1.9.28)
Y
h
= [
α
(r + δ)
]
α
1−α (1.9.29)
Ks =
hs
[(r + δ)α]
1
1−α
(1.9.30)
hs = [(1− α)[ α
(r + δ)
]
α
1−α ]
1
ω−1 (1.9.31)
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1.9.3 GMM Estimation Procedure
Let θ = [ρa, σa]
′ be the 2× 1 vector of structural parameters to be estimated. The
moment conditions are written as:
ut(θ) =

σy(θ)− (yt − y)2
σc(θ)− (ct − c)2
σi(θ)− (it − i)2
ρy,c(θ)− (yt−y)(ct−c)σy(θ)σc(θ)
ρy,i(θ)− (yt−y)(it−i)σy(θ)σi(θ)
ρy1(θ)− (yt−y)((yt−1−y)σ2y(θ)
ρy2(θ)− (yt−y)((yt−2−y)σ2y(θ)
ρc1(θ)− (ct−c)((ct−1−c)σ2c (θ)
ρc2(θ)− (ct−c)((ct−2−c)σ2c (θ)
ρi1(θ)− (it−i)((it−1−i)σ2i (θ)
ρi2(θ)− (it−i)((it−2−i)σ2i (θ)

where σx(θ), ρxy(θ) and ρxj(θ) denote the standard deviation of xt, the correlation
between xt and yt and the autocorrelation of order j of xt respectively, implied by the
theoretical model. These are functions of the vector θ of structural parameters. We
compute the moments implied by the theoretical model by solving a log-linearized
system of equilibrium conditions. Define Q = u′Wu, where u(θ) denotes moment
conditions and W is a symmetric positive definite matrix. The GMM estimate of
θ denoted by θ̂ is given by θ̂ = argminθQ(θ,W ). Since the number of moment
conditions exceed the number of estimated parameters, the weighting matrix W is
updated optimally.
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Chapter 2
Institutions, Openness and Reserve
Accumulation in Developing
Countries
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
The era of financial integration in emerging and developing countries can be
broadly compartmentalized into two distinct periods. The first phase in the 1990s
is characterized by current account deficits, capital flow reversals (sudden stops) and
financial and foreign exchange crises. The second period, kicked off in the 2000s,is
marked by a secular rise in foreign reserve accumulation [Painceira (2009)].
Interestingly enough, capital has flowed from developing to developed markets
during the past decade, as reflected in the net lending statistics. However, the most
noteworthy aspect of these upstream international capital flows has been the monu-
mental increase in international reserves held by several emerging economies. Reserve
assets usually take the form of various kinds of deposits, securities, gold, repurchase
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agreements and derivatives held by national monetary authorities. Current account
surpluses and private capital flows serve as the sources of official (public) capital flows.
In a recent thought-provoking paper, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) show that
the behavior of actual capital flows to developing countries is counterintuitive to
the predictions of the neoclassical growth model. In other words, faster-growing
developing economies tend to experience lower net capital inflows. In fact some of
them are net capital exporters.
Public capital flows, in particular accumulation of international reserves, play a
pivotal role in rationalizing this seemingly perverse capital allocation. Specifically,
capital outflows from fast-growing developing nations can be directly linked to their
policy of international reserve accumulation [Gourinchas–Jeanne (2011) Alfaro et al.
(2012)]. In addition, Alfaro et al. observe that whereas private capital flows are
broadly in sync with the standard neoclassical model, capital outflows from relatively
high-productivity emerging markets can be explained by accumulation of reserve as-
sets.
Several emerging and developing markets have been providing the rest of the world,
and especially the United States, with net resources in the form of current account
surpluses. This implies that a significant excess of domestic savings over investment
has, as a rule, been a characteristic shared by all major reserve accumulators.1
In a nutshell, two stylized facts stand out from the current literature: Faster-
growing developing countries are associated with lower net capital inflows and coun-
tries that grow faster accumulate more international reserves.
Reserve accumulation in most countries has gone beyond the levels warranted by
conventional indicators, suggesting that the build-up is largely influenced by other
1Foreign reserves tend to be generally invested in the safest assets in global financial markets,
which are issued mostly by the developed countries. US treasury securities are regarded as one of
the most prominent reserve asset options.
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factors. Three of the fundamental drivers of reserve accumulation, all of which can
be linked to financial globalization, stand out namely; A. Desire to self-insure against
sudden stops / financial crises (virtually all emerging markets share this motivation).
B. Pursuit of export-led growth by a number of Asian economies, supported by an
undervalued domestic currency. Reserves are utilized as a buffer against the impact
of negative terms of trade shocks on exports and the real exchange rate, thereby
facilitating adjustment of the current account. C. Combined effect of a number of
features related to the financial structure of several emerging markets, including un-
derdeveloped domestic financial systems and dollarization of foreign assets in certain
net creditor Asian economies.
To sum up, reserve accumulation has had two key economic ramifications for devel-
oping countries. First, it has led to upstream capital flows, and second, it has caused
a considerable increase in domestic debt for many developing countries, primarily
due to the sterilization response.2 In particular, Asian central banks have invested
their international reserves heavily in US public debt since the early 2000s. This
partly explains the connection between the US housing bubble (booming US finan-
cial market) during 2001–2007 and the international reserve holdings (excess savings)
of developing countries.
This paper analyzes the core issue of reserve accumulation in developing countries
both from empirical as well as theoretical perspectives. In particular, we focus on the
following questions:
2Massive reserve accumulation coupled with a concomitant rise in developing country domestic
debt can be attributed to the practice of sterilization to offset the potential inflationary impact of
foreign inflows. As argued by Papadatos (2009), several developing countries were compelled to
engage in sterilization so as to conform to the inflation targeting regime underlying the orthodox
macroeconomic policy framework of the recent years. Simply put, these economies expanded their
domestic borrowing not to channelize them into productive investment but to avoid resulting money
supply increases causing deviations from the pre-set inflation targets.
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1. What are the key patterns concerning reserve accumulation in emerging and
developing countries over the last 2 decades (1990–2010), the golden age of financial
globalization in the developing world?
2. Do we see any systematic variation across and between different regional clusters
(Emerging Asia, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa)
as well as across distinct income groups?
3. How can we explain key reserve accumulation patterns in developing countries
through the lens of institutional and financial heterogeneity? As a precursor to this
question, we provide empirical evidence supporting the claim that developing country
groups exhibit substantial structural differences in terms of openness, institutions, and
financial development.
4. Finally, how can we explain the relationship between institutional quality, fi-
nancial development and reserve accumulation in a simple theoretical framework?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the empirical
methodology and detailed description of the data, shedding light on the main variables
included in the empirical analysis. Section 2.3 covers three core elements of the
empirical methodology. First, we summarize select results from the partition-based
cluster analyses along with some robustness checks. Cross section regression analysis
and some noteworthy observations are discussed next. Finally, we discuss a series of
panel data models and summarize the key findings. Section 2.4 provides a literature
review to place the ensuing theoretical inquiry in context. Section 2.5 presents the
basic theoretical model, while Section 2.6 discusses some important comparative static
exercises. Section 2.7 presents concluding remarks.
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2.2 Data
We begin our empirical inquiry by compiling a dataset containing foreign reserve
statistics, institutional quality measures and indicators of financial development and
capital account openness for the majority of emerging and developing countries. Our
country coverage is guided by our focus on reserve accumulation dynamics in the past
two decades. A detailed country list along with the corresponding country codes, cat-
egorized by geographical area, is included in the appendix. This section provides a
detailed description of the key economic, institutional and financial variables included
in the analyses.
Financial Variables
We include the Chinn–Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2006 and 2008) in our dataset as a
measure of financial openness.3 In addition, variables encapsulating various facets of
a country’s financial system (institutions and markets) are extracted from the Global
Development Finance (GDF) Database (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2012).4 We choose
seven variables from the GDF dataset based on the authors’ recommendations of
suitable benchmarking candidates as well as those with the most consistent data cov-
erage for our sample.5 Select variables and the financial development dimension they
3We use the most recent data update to this index, which contains time series data for 182
countries for the period 1970–2011. A higher value of the Chinn–Ito index reflects a greater degree
of financial openness in an economy.
4GDF is an extensive dataset encompassing critical financial system characteristics for 205
economies spanning the past five decades (1960–2010). It builds on, updates, and extends previous
efforts, in particular the data collected for the ‘Database on Financial Development and Structure’
by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000, 2010). The database also incorporates data from the
Financial Access Survey, the Global Findex and Financial Soundness Indicators. Variables in this
dataset can be classified into four broad measurement rubrics: (a) size of financial institutions and
markets (financial depth), (b) degree to which individuals can and do use financial services (access),
(c) efficiency of financial system in intermediating resources and facilitating financial transactions
(efficiency), and (d) stability of financial institutions and markets (stability). This yields a 4x2
matrix of financial system characteristics.
5The GDF database underscores some important patterns emerging from cross-national analysis
of financial systems namely; i. Financial systems are multidimensional. ii. Striking differences
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measure are explained below.
1. Private Credit to GDP ratio (PrCrY1) denotes domestic private credit to the
real sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a percent-
age of GDP. Deposit money banks comprise commercial banks and other finan-
cial institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand deposits.6
[Depth]
2. Financial system Deposits to GDP ratio (FinDepY) measures total deposit vol-
ume of the entire financial system (demand, time and saving deposits in deposit
money banks and other financial institutions) as a fraction of a nation’s GDP.
[Depth]
3. Credit to Deposit ratio (CrDep) measures private credit extended by the deposit
money banks as a share of their demand, savings, and time deposits. [Depth]
4. Net Interest margin (NetInt) is the accounting value of a bank’s net interest
revenue as a percentage share of its average interest-bearing (total earning)
assets. It is calculated as (Interest Earned - Interest Paid)/ Average Interest
Earning Assets.7 [Efficiency]
5. Bank Z-score (BankZ) or distance to default is (ROA+equity/assets)/sd (ROA),
where ROA is average annual return on end-year assets and sd (ROA) is the
standard deviation of ROA. This variable explicitly compares buffers (capi-
talization and returns) with the potential for risk (volatility of returns). By
remain across regional groups and income levels. These regional aggregates mask considerable
disparities amongst individual countries (within the same region/income set).
6We have also included a second narrower measure of Private Credit to GDP (PrCrY) reflect-
ing private credit extended by the deposit money banks as a share of GDP. As evident from the
definitions, these two measures of financial institution depth track each other fairly closely.
7Net interest margin assesses the success of a bank’s investment strategy. In other words, a
positive net interest margin indicates that the investment strategy is profitable, as interest returns
outweigh the costs.
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construction, it is inversely related to the probability of a financial institution’s
insolvency, i.e. the probability that the value of its assets becomes lower than
the value of its liabilities. Simply put, a higher z-score implies a lower proba-
bility of insolvency. [Stability]
6. Stock market Capitalization to GDP ratio (StockCapY) is defined as the value
of listed shares as a percentage of GDP. [Depth]
7. Stock market Turnover ratio (StockTurn) is the ratio of the value of total shares
traded (transactions) to average real stock market capitalization (expressed as
a percentage). The logic being, the higher the turnover (the more liquidity),
the more efficient the market. [Efficiency]
Institutional Variables
The institutional quality measures are taken from a new dataset created by Kuncic
(2014). In his innovative empirical research, Kuncic integrates more than 30 cross-
national indicators underlining various dimensions of institutional quality and parti-
tions them into three distinct groups based on subject category classification: legal,
political, and economic. The central objective is to describe and compare different
institutional classification systems and empirically operationalize key institutional
concepts by bringing them to the data.
Kuncic also substantiates the claim that this three-way division is sufficient to en-
capsulate the formal institutional environment in a given country based on the factor
analysis results (factor loadings and eigenvalues) as well as pairwise correlations. We
use the relative country scores for two of the three measures (legal and economic) in
our dataset.8
8Inter-country factor analysis (calculating latent factors for each year separately for all the sample
countries) is performed to extract the true underlying institutional characteristics. This yields
a measure of relative institutional quality: i.e. where does a specific country stand in relation
to others? Standardized factor scores from Kuncic’s final dataset are used as institutional quality
indicators. His dataset also contains within-country absolute values of the three institutional quality
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Economic Variables
The amount of foreign exchange reserves (minus gold) (R) is central to our analysis.
Along with the absolute quantity of reserves, we also keep track of foreign reserves
as a fraction of GDP (RY). Aggregate income and growth indices constitute the final
set of economic variables. We use per capita GDP (PCY) and two notions of growth:
The average annual growth rate of per capita GDP (PCYgr) as well as absolute GDP
(Ygr) to capture the income and growth dynamics in our sample.9
A versatile and flexible methodology most suited for tracing cross-country varia-
tions in reserve accumulation is that of Cluster Analysis. It facilitates identification
of structural heterogeneities amongst developing countries by dividing them into dis-
tinct groups based on institutional quality and level of financial development, which is
one of our primary interests. Based on the nature of our dataset, we use the Kmeans
cluster analysis routine in Stata.10
We condense all the available information by averaging across five distinct time
windows: 1995–2010 (full sample), 1995–2000, 2001–2005, 2006–2010 (five year av-
erages) and 2001–2010 (decade average). This provides a more nuanced snapshot
of how (dis)similar these countries really are. We begin with a discussion of custer
analysis results in the next section, followed by a systematic inquiry using both cross
section as well as panel data models.
measures, based on scaled averages of raw indicators within each institutional category. However, as
noted by Kuncic, this is a cruder approach compared to the systematic factor analysis and therefore
needs to be used carefully.
9The data on economic variables is obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicator
Database. Total foreign reserves minus gold, per capita GDP, and GDP growth rates (PCYgr and
Ygr) are all expressed in current US dollars.
10Kmeans is a method of performing partition based cluster analysis. The user specifies the
number of clusters, k, to create using an iterative process. Each observation is assigned to the group
whose mean is the closest, and then based on that categorization, new group means are determined.
These steps continue until no observations change groups. The algorithm begins with k seed values,
which act as the k group means.
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2.3 Empirical Methodology
2.3.1 Cluster Analysis: Results and Discussion
We approach the partition-based cluster analysis in two distinct ways. The first is
a parsimonious cluster analysis which covers all the 44 countries in our sample but in-
cludes a restricted variable set (between three and five). We retain the main variable,
foreign reserves (R), in each specification and alternate between the economic, finan-
cial and institutional variables in different variations. This simultaneously tests the
robustness of the resulting cluster output. The second is a multidimensional (disaggre-
gated) cluster analysis covering a marginally smaller number of countries (conditional
on data availability) but including a maximum of eleven variables covering critical
aspects of institutional and financial structure. We report a few representative cluster
outputs in the appendix.
Several noticeable patterns emerge from the cluster analysis. The restricted-cluster
analysis yields a five-cluster decomposition of the sample [see cluster snapshot 1 in
the appendix]. Interestingly enough, BRIC nations along with newly industrialized
Asian giants (Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore) as well as select Asian (Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand) and Latin American (Mexico, Argentina) countries are placed at
the top end of the cluster in terms of reserve accumulation. However, three out of the
five clusters together cover less than a third of our total sample. The bottom two clus-
ters are the largest (with 31 members) and include most of the countries in Central
and Eastern Europe (except Poland, Turkey), Middle East-Africa and Latin America
(except Argentina, Brazil, Mexico). Very few (relatively less developed) Asian coun-
tries find themselves in the lower half of the reserve accumulation hierarchy (Nepal,
Bangladesh, Pakistan). This provides the first piece of empirical evidence in favor
of regional variations in reserve accumulation, with newly industrialized and emerg-
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ing Asia as clear outliers. The multidimensional cluster analysis with five clusters
seems broadly in line with its restricted counterpart. When we impose the four-
cluster division, the largest two clusters are mapped into one big group, preserving
the memberships in the other three clusters. (see cluster snapshot 2).11
The most striking fact is that China emerges as the only country with its own
(separate) cluster in almost all our cluster trials. Moreover, this single-member cluster
assignment is preserved in almost all bundles of institutional, financial, and economic
variables as well as all but two temporal aggregations (by decade, by five year time
windows, full sample). This highlights China’s truly unique reserve accumulation
experience, especially in the last decade, which clearly warrants special treatment.12
Descriptive statistics (presented in the appendix) based on the cluster outputs
reveal some important stylized facts. A dichotomy is evident between the high growth
countries with relatively closed (restricted) capital accounts versus slow-growing but
relatively open developing nations. The first set is at the top and the other at the
bottom of the reserve accumulation ladder. The relevant scatter plots linking reserve
dynamics with growth and financial openness also seem to support this pattern.
Next, we concentrate on the temporal evolution of reserve dynamics by focusing
on three five-year windows, the recent decade and the full fifteen year time series [see
cluster snapshots 1, 4 and 5 in the appendix]. Which countries (if any) change cluster
memberships over time and why is a natural question in this context.
The most noteworthy feature is that China and Singapore belonged to the same
cluster in the early part of our sample period (until the late 1990s) as reflected in
the first five-year window and the first decade. Thereafter, China branched out on
11Argentina appears to be the only exception, changing cluster memberships based on the speci-
fication of number of clusters(k).
12We also ran our analysis without China. The resulting cluster assignments are easily comparable
with those including China by simply reducing the cluster number by one. This reflects the near
impossibility of combining China with any other country in our sample.
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its own beginning in the early 2000s whereas Singapore joined the ranks of newly
industrialized Asian countries. Moreover, during the 1990s, the BRI countries (Brazil,
Russia, and India), newly industrialized Asian economies and other emerging nations
in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe (Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey, Poland) were grouped together. However, the past
decade has seen a marked difference in reserve dynamics between the BRI countries,
Korea, and Singapore from their emerging counterparts thus leading to a segmentation
of the big cluster into two. Also, the relatively recent emergence of Brazil as a leading
reserve holder in Latin America is noteworthy. Interestingly enough, several countries
in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and Middle East have retained
their original cluster associations over time. Finally, the cluster composition in the
2000s is more skewed (one big, two small, and a single-country cluster) compared to
the 1990s (two big, one medium, and a two-country cluster).
To test the accuracy and optimality of our cluster results, we undertake a series of
robustness checks using a wide range of variable combinations and several values of
K (number of clusters). We now discuss the sensitivity analysis results in brief.
In the parsimonious model, using either per capita income (PCY) or the average
annual GDP growth rate (Ygr) or both together in the cluster algorithm does not
change the cluster assignments. In addition, when we assign K=3 or K=5 (instead of
4), the two large clusters merge into a single cluster or the largest cluster gets split
into two, with identical cluster sizes as the benchmark case of K=4.
In case of the multidimensional cluster model, we include alternate measures of
income (per capita GDP / average annual GDP growth), sequentially drop one of the
three institutional quality indicators (legal, political, economic) from the specifica-
tions, and experiment with several sets of financial development measures (reflecting
depth, efficiency, stability of financial institutions and markets). In each of these nine
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iterations, the cluster memberships are broadly preserved. We also repeat all the
exercises for K = 5 instead of 4. As a result, the largest group (when K = 4) is split
into two groups (N = 16 and 12).13 Lastly, we employ the absolute distance metric
(L1) as the cluster (dis)similarity measure and compare the output against the de-
fault measure of Euclidean distance (L2). No significant changes in cluster sizes and
memberships are observed. In particular, some clusters memberships (and sizes) are
identical across all variable sets: e.g., China (single country cluster), Brazil, Russia,
India, Korea and Singapore (high growth emerging/newly industrialized counties) as
the second cluster and Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey
closely following them.
To conclude, several variable combinations yield qualitatively similar cluster re-
sults. This can be partly explained using the pairwise correlation matrix based on
Spearman’s rank correlation method. Many variables belonging to a particular group
[institutional quality indicators and financial development measures] display positive
correlations with each other. Therefore, replacing one with the other or creating an
aggregate index using all of them does not alter the final cluster outcomes signifi-
cantly.14
To shed light on the relationship between key financial, institutional, and economic
variables with foreign reserve dynamics, we create a series of scatter plots.15 Several
striking observations come to the fore as we carefully inspect each scatter set.
The scatter diagrams broadly confirm the positive association between economic
growth and reserve accumulation for the developing world as a whole. In particular,
13We also tried K = 3 and 6. In the cluster literature, a trade-off between larger K versus analytical
precision is often discussed. In light of this debate, we regard K = 4(or 5) as a reasonable choice.
14The entire rank correlation matrix is presented in the appendix.
15Each set of scatter diagrams focuses on the link between reserves and a specific variable, viewed
through the lens of non-overlapping time aggregates e.g. full sample, five year windows and the most
recent decade. The appendix presents select scatter plot sets, each depicting the relative position of
the four country clusters, as identified in the cluster analyses earlier.
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developing countries which have consistently reported strong GDP growth rates are
also among the largest reserve holders. Moreover, this is true not just for the absolute
amount of foreign reserves but also for the relative reserve share [see Figures 1,2 and
3].16 Interestingly enough, the degree of financial openness (captured by the Chinn–
Ito index) has a negative association with cumulative reserve holdings for each of the
time aggregations chosen. Moreover, this inverse relation seems to have gradually
intensified in the last decade (more so since the mid-2000s.) In other words, countries
with more open capital accounts have accumulated modest quantities of international
reserves (barring a few exceptions, most notably Singapore). In contrast, some of the
leading reserve holders are countries with a relatively closed capital account.This
trend has become more pronounced during the past decade (see Figures 2.4a and
2.4b).
The association between institutional quality and reserve accumulation is more
complex. This is not unexpected, given the complications associated with measuring
different categories of institutions (legal, political, economic) and their operational
efficiency. On one hand, quality of legal institutions seems to exert some positive
influence on reserve holdings. On the other hand, the relationship between eco-
nomic institutions and reserve dynamics is somewhat ambiguous irrespective of the
time classification used [see Figures 2.5a, 2.5b and 2.6a, 2.6b]. Furthermore, there
exists marked heterogeneity as far as the link between reserve accumulation and a
country’s legal foundation is concerned. In other words, when we inspect countries
with relatively underdeveloped legal institutions, both extremes co-exist: those hold-
ing substantial reserves as well as those at the bottom end of the reserves scale.
Variables measuring different aspects of financial development (depth, efficiency, and
stability) are considerably different in terms of their relationship with foreign reserves
16We experimented with both nominal GDP as well as per capita GDP growth rates to measure
economic growth. The qualitative results are preserved.
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[see Figures 2.7a, 2.7b, and 2.7c]. Whereas depth of the financial system (proxied by
private credit extended by the financial system or stock market capitalization) seems
to be positively linked with reserve holdings; the reverse is true as far as financial
institution efficiency is concerned. In other words, several countries with large net
interest margin (indicative of a successful financial investment strategy) do not seem
to be reporting large foreign reserve volumes and vice versa. The link between fi-
nancial stability (Bank Z-score) and reserves is even more intriguing. The top tier
of reserve accumulators consists of two extremes: countries with relatively stable as
well as vulnerable financial systems.
Thus, a bird’s eye view of the scatter plots encapsulating various dimensions of
income, institutional quality and financial development points towards the resounding
presence of structural heterogeneity in our sample. We investigate it further in the
next two subsections.
2.3.2 Cross Section Analysis
Cluster analyses as well as the scatter plot series, albeit informative, serve as
precursors to a more rigorous statistical inquiry. Therefore, we treat them as the
first step in uncovering the underlying trends in our data. The objective of regression
analysis is two-fold. First, to detect the presence of cluster and regional heterogeneity
with respect to openness, institutions and financial development. And second, to
examine the relative importance of structural heterogeneity in explaining observed
patterns of reserve accumulation.
For the cross section regressions with five different time aggregates we begin with
the rudimentary specification, including just the main effect of explanatory variables.
In the panel data models, described in the next subsection, we gradually transition
to an extended specification incorporating cluster and regional interactions.
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Basic linear regression framework of the form Y = α + βX +  is employed in
the cross section models. The dependent variable Y in all model variants is log of
Reserves. X is a vector of independent variables that vary across models (different
combinations of financial, institutional, and economic indicators). Tables 2.1a, 2.1b
and 2.1c present the main results of the cross section models. Let us describe the key
findings in detail.17
• Impact of income per capita on reserve accumulation is positive and highly
significant across all five periods. In addition, higher GDP growth is associated
with higher reserve holdings in the latter half of our sample (specifically during
the past decade).
• Contrary to the effect of income, more financial openness (measured by im-
provement in the Chinn–Ito index) has a consistent, negative relationship with
reserve holdings for all time periods under consideration.
• Of all the financial variables, two seem to matter in particular for reserve dy-
namics in the cross section context: stock market capitalization to GDP ratio
and stock market turnover ratio, indicative of financial market depth and effi-
ciency respectively.
• Furthermore, the model testing the effect of institutional quality on reserve
accumulation yields strikingly mixed results. While legal institutions have a
mildly positive impact on reserves, the quality of economic institutions exerts
a strong negative influence on reserve accumulation across the board. How
and why certain less financially open countries with relatively inferior economic
institutions tend to amass large volumes of foreign reserves is an intriguing
17Cheung, Ito(2009) investigate the key determinants of international reserves using a sample of
major developed as well as developing countries. Our empirical approach, however, is considerably
different not only in terms of country coverage, time-period, and variable selection but also in the
use of cluster analysis as a unique way of partitioning the sample into groups of relatively similar
countries. Moreover, we employ panel data specifications in addition to our cross-section models.
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question both from an academic as well as policy standpoint.
In a nutshell, income, institutions, openness and financial market indicators play an
important role in explaining cross-national variation in reserve accumulation. Having
said that, some caveats involved in the cross-section framework need to mentioned.
Our basic model assumes one β for the entire country sample. By forcing coefficient
uniqueness this way, we are unable to capture the effects conditional on cluster mem-
berships and regional groups. We tackle different dimensions of country heterogeneity
in the next subsection with more elaborate panel data models.
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Table 2.1a: Growth, Openness and Reserves 
 
 F1 F2 F3 D2 Full 
PCGDP 0.97*** 0.96*** 1.02*** 1.03*** 0.97*** 
 (0.22) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.22) 
      
GDP growth 0.16 0.03 0.22** 0.24* 0.38*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) 
      
FinOpen Index -0.42** -0.57*** -0.49*** -0.57*** -0.84*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) 
Observations 44 44 44 44 40 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1b: Institutions and Reserves 
 
 F1 F2 F3 D2 Full 
PCGDP 1.31*** 1.25*** 0.85** 1.03*** 1.17*** 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.34) 
      
Inst-Legal -0.19 1.49** 1.20** 1.41** 0.98* 
 (0.53) (0.56) (0.53) (0.56) (0.55) 
      
Inst-Economic -1.09** -2.26*** -1.46*** -1.91*** -2.13*** 
 (0.47) (0.55) (0.51) (0.55) (0.52) 
Observations 41 42 42 42 40 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Note: The five model headers correspond to the specific time aggregates we consider namely; three five-year 
windows 1995-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, the most recent decade 2001-2010, and the full cross section period 
1995-2010. Dependent variable is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are per capita income (log), 
average annual GDP growth and the Chinn-Ito index (proxy for financial openness) and quality of legal as well as 
economic institutions in a particular country relative to others. The sample size varies slightly in each scenario based 
on data availability. 
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Table 2.1c: Financial Development and Reserves 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Note: The five model headers correspond to the specific time aggregates we consider namely; three five-year 
windows 1995-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, the most recent decade 2001-2010, and the full cross section period 
1995-2010. Dependent variable is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are per capita income (log), 
net interest margin, stock market capitalization to GDP and stock market turnover ratio (both in logs). The sample 
size varies slightly in each scenario based on data availability. 
. 
 
 F1 F2 F3 D2 Full 
 
PCGDP 
 
0.32* 
 
0.26 
 
0.47** 
 
0.38** 
 
0.33 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) 
      
Net Interest 
Margin 
-0.02 0.07 0.15 0.26* 0.24** 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) 
      
Stock Cap to GDP 
Ratio 
0.32 0.42* 0.33* 0.38* 0.37* 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
      
Stock Turnover 
Ratio 
0.56*** 0.58*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.72*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) 
      
      
      
Observations 39 39 41 41 40 
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2.3.3 Panel Data Analysis
Our extended panel dataset includes 44 countries over the last 20 years (1990–
2010). This set-up is particularly advantageous, as we can explicitly introduce time
effects to capture the impact of global macroeconomic events (common to all coun-
tries) on the temporal evolution of reserve accumulation. In addition, this framework
facilitates the inspection of cluster-based as well as regional heterogeneity by includ-
ing their interactions with select financial, institutional, and economic variables. We
can thus retain the intra-cluster similarity as well as separately factor in inter-cluster
variations to better understand individual country experiences with reserve holdings
and any generic patterns reflected in the data. For comparison purposes, we start our
panel data analysis with the same baseline specification as in the cross section models
(just the main effects). We employ fixed effects regression models and include time
dummies for the three (non-overlapping) five year windows 1995–2000, 2001–2005 and
2006–2010. Tables 2.2a provides a result snapshot of the baseline model.
Consistent with the cross section models, income per capita continues to be posi-
tively linked with reserve accumulation. Moreover, improvements in financial open-
ness and quality of legal institutions have a weakly negative and positive impact
on reserve holdings respectively. However, contrary to the cross section results, the
quality of economic institutions is positively associated with reserve dynamics in de-
veloping countries. Also, several aspects of financial development such as financial
institution depth (private credit to GDP ratio, financial system deposits to GDP ratio)
as well as financial market depth and efficiency (stock market capitalization to GDP
and stock turnover ratio) seem to matter for reserve accumulation. Lastly, all three
time dummies are highly significant across all model variants. The effects intensify
over time underlining the increasing relevance of global macroeconomic phenomena
in explaining reserve accumulation in the developing world.
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 Table 2.2a: Income, Institutions and Reserves I 
 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
PCGDP(log) 1.07***  1.06***  
 (0.07)  (0.07)  
     
GDP Growth  0.01***  0.02*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
     
FinOpen Index -0.04** -0.02   
 (0.02) (0.02)   
     
Inst- Legal 0.12** 0.10*   
 (0.05) (0.06)   
     
Inst-Economic 0.11** 0.33***   
 (0.05) (0.06)   
     
PrCrY Ratio(log)   0.43***  
   (0.07)  
     
FinDepY Ratio(log)    0.86*** 
    (0.09) 
     
CrDep Ratio (log)   -0.67*** 0.16** 
   (0.09) (0.08) 
     
StockCapY(log)   0.06** 0.07** 
   (0.03) (0.03) 
     
StockTurnover(log)   0.09*** 0.11*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
     
Time1:1995-2000  0.41*** 0.72*** 0.32*** 0.48*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
     
Time2:2001-2005  0.86*** 1.37*** 0.61*** 0.91*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
     
Time3:2006-2010  1.12*** 2.27*** 0.79*** 1.60*** 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
Observations 803 803 674 673 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are different 
combinations of economic, financial and institutional variables explained in the data section. The last three rows 
capture the impact of global macroeconomic events (during the three five year windows) on reserve accumulation. 
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As noted in the previous subsection, there is no a priori reason to expect that
the effects of financial, institutional, and economic variables on reserve accumulation
are identical for all developing countries. We are interested in identifying whether
the effects of income, institutions and openness vary based on cluster-affiliation and
geography. Shutting off the cluster-specific variation by combining their effects into
a unique coefficient could lead to misleading inferences and is therefore clearly sub-
optimal. This sets the stage for augmenting our basic model to include cluster-
interactions. A summary of panel data models with cluster effects is presented in
Table 2.2b and 2.2c.18
Several interesting observations arise from these extended panel models:
• GDP per capita stands out as a strong positive influence on reserve accumulation
for each of the four clusters in our sample. In particular, effect of PCY on
reserve volumes is the strongest in case of China and other high growth emerging
markets (BRI nations + newly industrialized Asian economies) representing
clusters 2 and 3 respectively.
• Degree of financial openness is positively associated with reserve accumulation
in China and other high-growth Asian + BRI nations and has a mildly negative
impact on reserve accumulation in cluster 4 (the largest group in our sample
mainly composed of countries in CEE, LatAM and MENA).
• Most notably, quality of economic institutions in China and other high-growth
Asian + BRI economies is negatively associated with reserve accumulation in
these countries. The impact is quantitatively substantial, particularly for China.
On the contrary, quality of economic institutions seems to be weakly favorable
for reserve holdings in the remaining two clusters.
18We experimented with cluster interactions of all the variables from our original specification.
However, based on their significance and explanatory power we have retained a subset of them in
the final specification.
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• Depth of financial institutions (proxied by private credit to GDP ratio) is posi-
tively related to reserve accumulation in all the clusters except for China. Mag-
nitude of this effect is the largest in case of high-growth Asian + BRI economies
(cluster 3).
• Depth and efficiency of financial markets (measured by stock market capitaliza-
tion to GDP and stock turnover ratio) is positively linked with reserve dynamics
in almost three-fourth of our sample (represented by clusters 3 and 4), except
in case of China, Mexico, Poland, Turkey and some nations in emerging Asia.
• Finally, the secularly rising magnitude of time effects (preserved across all spec-
ifications) reflects the increasing relevance of global macroeconomic develop-
ments in explaining reserve accumulation dynamics recent times.
In addition to the cluster-specific effects explained above, we also examine how
the impact of income, openness and institutions varies by geography. These regional
interactions provide a second vantage point to decipher the underlying trends in
reserve accumulation in our data. They also complement the cluster effects examined
earlier. We create five regional dummies for Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE), Latin America (LatAm) and Middle East- North Africa (MENA) and interact
them with key explanatory variables. Then we use these extended variable sets in
a series of regression models. Tables 2.3a through 2.3h depict panel results with
regional effects.
Key observations emerging from the regional interactions help shed light on the
subtleties of cluster-variation with respect to reserve accumulation. To begin with,
the robust effect of per capita income on reserve holdings seems to be guided by
its sizable magnitude in case of Africa, Asia, and CEE. Also, degree of financial
openness seems to positively affect reserve volumes in Africa, CEE and Asia (though
the effect is not quantitatively large.) but has a weakly negative impact in case of
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reserve accumulation by Latin America. This regional dichotomy can partly reconcile
the seemingly inconclusive cross section and panel results reported earlier. Relative
quality of legal institutions has a two-fold impact on reserve dynamics; strengthening
reserve holdings in Africa and Latin America and dampening reserve volumes in CEE
as well as MENA countries.
As far as the financial development indicators are concerned, depth of financial
institutions (private credit to GDP and financial system deposits to GDP ratio) has
a sizable positive payoff for reserve accumulation in Africa, Asia and CEE but not
so much for Latin America and MENA. In addition, depth and efficiency of stock
markets (capitalization to GDP and turnover ratio) matter the most in case of Africa
and Asia.
To sum up, income, openness, institutional quality, and financial development play
an instrumental role in explaining the underlying patterns of reserve accumulation
in the developing world. Moreover, impacts of these structural parameters vary con-
siderably by cluster (relatively similar countries) and geography, not only in terms of
their magnitude (strong/mild) but also by direction (positive/negative).
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 Table 2.2b: Income, Institutions and Reserves II - Cluster Effects 
 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Cluster1#PCGDP 0.67***   
 (0.11)   
    
Cluster2#PCGDP 1.35***   
 (0.19)   
    
Cluster3#PCGDP 1.48***   
 (0.12)   
    
Cluster4#PCGDP 0.98***   
 (0.08)   
    
Cluster1#FinOpen Index 0.02 0.00 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
    
Cluster2#FinOpen Index -0.07 1.40*** 1.34*** 
 (0.48) (0.46) (0.45) 
    
Cluster3#FinOpen Index 0.07 0.22** 0.26*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
    
Cluster4#FinOpen Index -0.05** -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
    
Cluster1#Inst-Economic -0.07 0.32** 0.33*** 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) 
    
Cluster2#Inst-Economic -0.21 -2.29*** -2.29*** 
 (0.70) (0.60) (0.61) 
    
Cluster3#Inst-Economic -0.54** -0.55* -0.69** 
 (0.25) (0.29) (0.29) 
    
Cluster4#Inst-Economic 0.19*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
    
Inst-Legal 0.09* 0.11* 0.09 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
    
Time1: 1995-2000 0.41*** 0.72*** 0.70*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
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 Time2: 2001-2005 0.87*** 1.35*** 1.34*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
    
Time3: 2006-2010 1.17*** 2.26*** 2.25*** 
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) 
    
Cluster1#GDP Growth  0.01  
  (0.01)  
    
Cluster2#GDP Growth  -0.03  
  (0.04)  
    
Cluster3#GDP Growth  0.04***  
  (0.01)  
    
Cluster4#GDP Growth  0.01**  
  (0.01)  
Observations 773 773 773 
    Standard errors in parentheses. 
    * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Note: Dependent variable in all three models is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are 
interactions of four country clusters with per capita income (log), average annual GDP growth the Chinn-Ito index 
(proxy for financial openness), and relative quality of economic institutions in a particular country vis a vis its other 
developing counterparts. Legal institution quality is included as a normal control since the corresponding cluster 
effects are not particularly significant. The time effects for each of the five-year windows namely; 1995-2000, 
2001-2005 and 2006-2010 capture the effects of global macroeconomic events (common for the entire sample) on 
reserve accumulation. 
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Table 2.2c: Financial Development and Reserves - Cluster Effects 
 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Cluster1#PCGDP 0.88***   
 (0.11)   
    
Cluster2#PCGDP 1.60***   
 (0.50)   
    
Cluster3#PCGDP 0.54**   
 (0.22)   
    
Cluster4#PCGDP 1.03***   
 (0.09)   
    
Cluster1#GDP Growth  0.01  
  (0.01)  
    
Cluster2#GDP Growth  -0.01  
  (0.12)  
    
Cluster3#GDP Growth  0.03**  
  (0.01)  
    
Cluster4#GDP Growth  0.01**  
  (0.01)  
    
Cluster1#PrCr to GDP 0.37**   
 (0.17)   
    
Cluster2#PrCr to GDP 0.26   
 (1.18)   
    
Cluster3#PrCr to GDP 1.29***   
 (0.36)   
    
Cluster4#PrCr to GDP 0.39***   
 (0.09)   
    
Cluster1#Deposit-GDP   0.50** 0.05 
  (0.22) (0.30) 
    
Cluster2#Deposit-GDP   0.29 0.96 
  (1.73) (1.70) 
    
Cluster3#Deposit-GDP   1.30*** 1.85*** 
  (0.36) (0.47) 
    
Cluster4#Deposit-GDP   0.89*** 0.70*** 
  (0.10) (0.12) 
    
Cluster1#Credit-Deposit  -0.80*** -0.11 0.26 
 (0.18) (0.14) (0.19) 
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Cluster2#Credit-Deposit  -0.07 -3.79 -2.44 
 (2.42) (4.96) (2.56) 
    
Cluster3#Credit-Deposit  0.02 1.32*** 1.06** 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.49) 
    
Cluster4#Credit-Deposit  -0.65*** 0.13 0.32*** 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) 
    
Cluster1#StockCap-Y  -0.06 0.00 -0.28*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) 
    
Cluster2#StockCap-Y  -0.06 0.26 0.38 
 (0.28) (0.43) (0.27) 
    
Cluster3#StockCap-Y  0.41*** 0.31** -0.09 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) 
    
Cluster4#StockCap-Y  0.08*** 0.07* 0.18*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
    
Cluster1#StockTurnover  0.06 0.15**  
 (0.07) (0.07)  
    
Cluster2#StockTurnover  -0.09 0.30  
 (0.30) (0.29)  
    
Cluster3#StockTurnover  0.29*** 0.29***  
 (0.10) (0.11)  
    
Cluster4#StockTurnover  0.08*** 0.09***  
 (0.02) (0.02)  
    
Net Interest Margin   -0.02* 
   (0.01) 
    
Stock Turnover Ratio   0.05* 
   (0.03) 
    
Time1: 1995-2000  0.32*** 0.46***  
 (0.06) (0.06)  
    
Time2: 2001-2005  0.60*** 0.87*** 0.42*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) 
    
Time3: 2006-2010  0.82*** 1.56*** 1.09*** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) 
Observations 638 638 451 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Note: Dependent variable is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are select financial development 
indicators explained in the data section. The last three rows correspond to the time effects (for each of the five-year 
windows defined earlier) capturing effects of global macroeconomic events on reserve accumulation. 
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2.4 Relevant Literature
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, emerging economies embraced widespread fi-
nancial liberalization. However, in the efforts to balance the twin goals of exchange
rate stability and monetary independence, many of them experienced severe finan-
cial crises. In the aftermath of such financial turmoil, many emerging markets have
adopted the policy mix of managed (flexible) exchange rate regime, coupled with con-
tinued financial integration while maintaining domestic monetary sovereignty. Hoard-
ing of substantial international reserves has become the hallmark of developing coun-
tries in general and emerging Asia, in particular. These countries are still engaged
in exchange rate management to a considerable extent. Combating upward pressure
on their domestic currencies amid concerns about preserving monetary stability has
compelled them to complement international reserve accumulation with aggressive
sterilization measures.
Reserve accumulation, decidedly, has monetary implications. Once the decision
to accumulate foreign reserves is made, how to fund this purchase is the next ques-
tion. One option is to increase the monetary base, which is potentially inflationary.
The alternative is to reduce net domestic assets in order to sterilize the impact of
reserve accumulation on the monetary base and eliminate the resulting inflationary
impact. Specifically, when foreign reserve asset purchase is accompanied by inflation-
ary pressures via increase in the base money, monetary authorities (central banks)
step in.
The intervention is captured by sterilizing the excessive liquidity creation to mit-
igate inflationary forces and associated real exchange rate appreciation, as well as
to avoid sacrificing domestic monetary control. Policymakers often rely on contrac-
tionary monetary policy such as open market sales, increased reserve requirements
and/or window guidance (direct control on credit volumes of selected banks) to off-
75
set the potential inflationary impact of foreign capital flows. In particular, central
banks sell treasury bills or central bank paper to the domestic private sector so as
to neutralize some or all of the monetary expansion associated with accumulation of
foreign exchange reserves (sterilized intervention). Other sterilization measures in-
clude raising banks’ statutory minimum reserve requirements or increasing discount
rates.19
Recent research by Aizenman and Glick (2009) points towards the intensification in
the degree of sterilization practiced by several economies in Asia and Latin America.
The authors undertake a rigorous empirical investigation of changing sterilization
dynamics within the emerging markets as they continue to make strides in the process
of financial liberalization. Their central empirical result underscores the fact that the
extent of sterilization of foreign reserve inflows has risen in recent years to varying
degrees in Asia as well as Latin America. Moreover, their econometric analysis detects
important structural shifts in the pattern of reserve hoardings by developing countries,
one in the early 1990s (increasing Reserves to GDP ratio) and the other in the early
2000s: a monumental increase in international reserve holdings by China.
In the case of China, extent of sterilization was relatively mild until the early
2000s. Since mid-2002, China’s foreign reserve inflows rose sharply, accompanied
by negative changes in domestic asset holdings by the central bank reflecting a tight
money policy. This provides strong evidence for active sterilization practiced in China.
Similar sterilization experiences have been reported in other Asian countries such as
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and India, and also in select Latin American countries
namely; Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.20
19Hagiwara (2004) highlights the policy dilemma associated with reserve sterilization using India
and China as case studies. In India, open market operations and continuous repo operations under
the Liquidity Adjustment Facility have been conducted to sterilize the impact of substantial US
dollar purchases on domestic reserve money. Net sales of government dated securities issued by the
Reserve Bank of India reached its peak in late 2003 amounting to Rs.139 billion.
20They employ a simple regression specification of change in net domestic assets on change in
net foreign assets (both scaled by the monetary base and change computed over four quarters) so
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Reserve accumulation and accompanying sterilization can exacerbate financial dis-
tortions. Countries with relatively lower costs of sterilization, possibly due to greater
tolerance to domestic financial system distortion, might accumulate ever-increasing
amounts of international reserves, emerging as short run winners in the reserve hoard-
ing game. This seems to be the reality in several Asian economies (China being the
glaring example). However, one must be careful while weighting the short-run ben-
efits of reserve accumulation against its short and long run costs and examine the
likelihood of costs overshadowing the benefits over time. We use the term steriliza-
tion in a restrictive sense: capturing open market operations conducted in order to
absorb excess liquidity resulting from foreign reserve accumulation.
2.5 Model
2.5.1 Basic Framework
In this and the following section, we describe our benchmark small open economy
framework. Some of its features are borrowed from models of credit constraints with
a housing sector, pioneered by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). We
use a few key ingredients from their original framework, simplified to suit our research
inquiry. In addition, we introduce the sterilization dimension where the government
sector accumulates foreign reserves and also conducts open market operations in re-
sponse to the foreign reserve inflows.There is no central bank and therefore no explicit
role for monetary policy in our model.21 We recast the housing asset (H) as a gov-
ernment bond, which is an open market instrument held by the households and used
as collateral.
as to facilitate the interpretation of the sterilization coefficient (β) as follows: β = -1 (complete
sterilization) β = 0 (No sterilization), β between -1 and 0 (partial sterilization).
21Since we use a ‘real’ model, we need to interpret the term sterilization in a narrow sense: linking
reserve accumulation policy with sale of government securities.
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The economy consists of two agents: Households (private agents) and the Govern-
ment. It does not seem necessary to explicitly introduce the firm as another optimizing
entity so we use the aggregate production function and capital accumulation equation
as a reduced form description of economy-wide production activity.
Households are assumed to be credit-constrained. They engage in private borrow-
ing as well as hold a one-period bond issued by the domestic government. The extent
of their private borrowing is limited by the collateralized value of their total bond
wealth. In other words, government acts as the super-intermediary in our model.
Its critical role is to mitigate the imperfections caused by domestic financial market
inefficiency.22
The reason we need both private borrowing and bonds (akin to government securi-
ties in open market operations) is because one constitutes an asset and the other serves
as a collateral to help relax the domestic credit constraint. In essence, households
supply labor and capital for production purposes, borrow privately, hold government
bonds, pay taxes (net of transfers) to the government and use the income for con-
sumption, investment, tax payment and increasing their asset holdings/borrowing.
Why should the private agents be motivated to hold low-yielding government secu-
rities? The answer can be linked to the role of government bonds in relaxing the
household’s borrowing constraint.
An important assumption we make is that the representative household is impa-
tient (has a lower discount factor and thus discounts the future heavily.) Moreover,
the small open economy is characterized by an inefficiently low level of capital and
output. In a frictionless world with no market inefficiencies, marginal product of cap-
ital would be identical to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution governed
22This is a critical assumption in the model, as it implicitly restricts several avenues of foreign in-
vestment such as foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign institutional investment (FII) etc. Domes-
tic agents cannot borrow indefinitely and foreign investors cannot engage in unfettered investment
in domestic financial assets. This is indicative of inefficiency in domestic financial markets.
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by the household’s rate of time preference. With relatively scarce capital stock, this
would imply that the economy in question receives foreign capital (inflows). However,
this runs contrary to the evidence of uphill foreign capital flows. Therefore, it must
be the case that financial market inefficiencies (caused by relatively underdeveloped
financial system) create a wedge between the marginal product of domestic capital
stock (MPK) and the world interest rate (R).
Each period, the domestic government raises funds by levying taxes and issues
securities to households via open market operations. The total revenue generated is
used to accumulate foreign exchange reserves and paying off last period’s debt. We
further assume that the primary motive for holding international reserves is their
role as sovereign collateral (buffer stock protecting against unforeseen phenomena
such as sudden stops). Reserve accumulation, in turn, relaxes the household’s credit
constraint, putting downward pressure on the domestic interest rate.
One can envision the government in this economy running a warehouse of re-
serves. Government bonds serve as warehouse certificates/coupons, and households
hold these certificates which serve as indirect claims on international reserves.23 We
now translate the basic tenets of our story into the system of equations governing the
benchmark model.
23This is analogous to thinking about gold being the only form of reserve that can be held. In
this case, no one would like to risk keeping gold in their house. Therefore, government would act as
the custodian of gold and issue claims based on specific value of gold, which in turn would be held
by the households.
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2.5.2 The Benchmark Model
Household (Private Agent)
The representative household maximizes the period utility function given below.
Ut = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt[lnCt − Lt
η
η
] (2.5.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time discount factor and η is a measure of labor supply
elasticity.
Subject to the following inter-temporal budget constraint:
wtLt + rtKt +QtHt +Bt ≥ Ct + It + Tt +Ht+1 +RBt−1 (2.5.2)
wt: Wage rate
rt: Rental rate
Qt: Yield (interest rate paid) on the government bond
Ht: One period government bond
Bt: Private borrowing by the household in the international market
Ct: Consumption
It: Investment spending
Tt: Federal Taxes (net of transfer payments)
R: World Interest rate (cost of private borrowing)
In addition, the households are faced with a borrowing (credit) constraint such that
their bond holdings are limited by a fraction of the aggregate bond equity they possess
since the one period bond is used as a collateral.
Bt ≤ γHHt (2.5.3)
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Where γh reflects the fraction of bond equity pledged as collateral. A higher value of
γH helps relax the household’s credit constraint. Thus γH serves as a reduced form
way of capturing the degree of financial market development.
Government
The budget constraint of government can be described by the following identity
equating the sources and uses of funds.
Ht+1 + Tt +Xt−1 = QtHt +Xt (2.5.4)
The sources of funds consist of net tax revenue (Tt), newly issued bonds during the
current period (Ht+1) and foreign reserves from the last period (Xt−1). The uses of
funds are debt repayment for the last period (QtHt) as well as newly accumulated
foreign reserves (Xt).
24
Rearranging the terms yields the following government budget constraint:
Ht+1 + Tt = (Xt −Xt−1) +QtHt (2.5.5)
In addition, we use the following equation to establish the association between
government bonds (open market sales) and international reserve accumulation.
Ht = γXXt (2.5.6)
Bond issuance must be backed by an adequate amount of international reserves (col-
lateral), to protect the government’s credibility in the event of a financial panic or
crisis of confidence.
24We assume that price of the one-period bond today is one dollar and it pays Qt (rate of return)
in the next period.
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Combining the household’s borrowing constraint with the equation linking open
market operation (bond issuance) and reserve accumulation yields:
Bt = γHγXXt (2.5.7)
The above equation encapsulates two critical dimensions. 1. How many units of bonds
Ht does the government issue for each dollar of foreign reserves held (γx) 2. How well
does Ht serve as collateral to facilitate private borrowing by relaxing household’s
credit constraint? In addition, this equation shows that governments can potentially
compensate for lower efficiency of the domestic financial system (captured by smaller
values of either or both of the γ parameters) by accumulating more foreign reserves.
The aggregate production function in the economy is given by:
Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t (2.5.8)
where At denotes total factor productivity and α is the share of capital in production.
The law of motion for the total capital stock is given by:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (2.5.9)
The aggregate budget constraint for the economy is derived by integrating the
period budget constraints for households and the government, assuming that they
hold with equality in equilibrium. Therefore we have:
wtLt+rtKt+QtHt+Bt+Ht+1+Tt = Ct+It+Tt+Ht+1+RBt−1+(Xt−Xt−1)+QtHt
(2.5.10)
Canceling common terms on both sides leads to the following national income ac-
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counting identity in our benchmark small open economy model:
Yt ≡ wtLt + rtKt = Ct + It + (RBt−1 −Bt) + (Xt −Xt−1) (2.5.11)
Total factor income is thus equal to the sum of domestic spending (consumption
+ investment), net private borrowings, and foreign reserve accumulation.25
To begin with, we solve the model and derive the following optimality conditions
with respect to Ct, Lt, Kt+1, Ht+1, and Bt.
1
Ct
= λt (2.5.15)
Lη−1t =
wt
Ct
(2.5.16)
1
Ct
= βEt[
1
Ct+1
(rt+1 + 1− δ)] (2.5.17)
1
Ct
− βEt 1
Ct+1
Qt+1 = βγHEtµt+1 (2.5.18)
The left hand side of the above equation represents the user cost of bond holding in
terms of marginal utility of consumption.
1
Ct
− βREt 1
Ct+1
= µt (2.5.19)
Equations 2.5.15 and 2.5.16 represent the standard optimality conditions with
25Using the production function, we can derive the optimality conditions with respect to labor
and capital.
wt = (1− α)[Yt/Lt] (2.5.12)
rt = α[Yt/Kt] (2.5.13)
Therefore total factor payments (wages and rental income) exhaust the aggregate output, satisfying
the Euler Theorem.
wtLt + rtKt = (1− α)[Yt/Lt] ∗ Lt + α[Yt/Kt] ∗Kt = (1− α)Yt + αYt = Yt (2.5.14)
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respect to Ct (equating marginal utility of consumption with the shadow value of
household’s budget constraint) and Lt (labor-leisure trade-off). First order condition
with respect Kt+1 yields the Euler equation 2.5.17. First order condition with re-
spect to Ht (eq. 2.5.18) links the user cost of owning a bond for one period with the
shadow value of the credit constraint, where λt and µt are the shadow values associ-
ated with the household’s budget constraint and the credit constraint, respectively.
Finally, equation 2.5.19 establishes the link between the two multipliers, rate of time
preference, and the world interest rate.
From the production function, we get the following factor market equilibrium con-
ditions for labor Lt and capital Kt.
wt = (1− α)[Yt/Lt] (2.5.20)
rt = α[Yt/Kt] (2.5.21)
Next, we calculate the steady state of our benchmark model.26 We can then
use numerical experiments and comparative static exercises to understand how spe-
cific combinations of structural parameters (governing institutional environment and
financial development) are consistent with the policy of substantial reserve accumu-
lation.(A pattern observed in several emerging countries most notably emerging Asia
and Latin America.)27
26The subscript ‘s’ denotes the steady state value of a given variable.
27Detailed derivations of the first order conditions as well as the steady state solutions are presented
in the appendix.
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2.5.3 Steady State
The steady state capital-output, labor-output, and capital-labor ratios as well as
the steady state values of output, consumption, capital, investment and labor are
calculated using the expressions derived below.
Ys
Ks
= [
1− β + βδ
αβ
] (2.5.22)
Ks
Ls
= [
Ys
Ks
]
1
α−1 = [
1− β + βδ]
αβ
]
1
α−1 (2.5.23)
Ys
Ls
= [
1− β + βδ
αβ
]
α
α−1 (2.5.24)
ws = (1− α)[1− β + βδ
αβ
]
α
α−1 (2.5.25)
rs = α[
1− β + βδ
αβ
] = [
1− β + βδ
β
] (2.5.26)
R <
1
β
= (r + 1− δ) (2.5.27)
Cs =
1
λs
(2.5.28)
(1− βR)λs = µs (2.5.29)
Qs =
1
β
[1− βµsγH
λs
] (2.5.30)
Ys = (1− α)
1
η−1 (λs)
1
η−1 [
Ys
Ls
]
η
η−1 (2.5.31)
Ks = [
Ks
Ys
]Ys = [
αβ
1− β + βδ ]Ys (2.5.32)
Ls = [(1− α)λsYs]
1
η = (wλs)
1
η−1 (2.5.33)
Is = δKs (2.5.34)
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Combining the household’s borrowing constraint with the relationship between gov-
ernment bonds and foreign reserves we have:
Bs = γHHs (2.5.35)
Hs = γXXs (2.5.36)
Therefore: Bs = γHγXXs.
We have assumed that β < 1/R. Therefore, equation 2.5.19 in steady state implies
that µ > 0 meaning that the households are faced with a binding borrowing constraint
(using the complimentary slackness theorem).
Note that the aggregate resource constraint in the steady state is given by:28
Ys = Cs + Is + (R− 1)Bs = Cs + δKs + (R− 1)Bs (2.5.37)
Substituting the value of Ks in terms of Ys and plugging in the steady state expres-
sions for Cs, Bs we have:
Ys[1− δKs
Ys
] =
1
λs
+ (R− 1)γHγXXs (2.5.38)
Our main objective is to calculate the numerical steady state of the benchmark
model before proceeding to the comparative static experiments using various com-
binations of structural parameters (γH , γX) and reserve policy choice X. We pick
standard parameter α = 0.3, β = 0.99, δ = 0.05 and η = 4 to compute the steady
28There is no net reserve accumulation in the steady state since Xt = Xt−1. Nevertheless, gov-
ernment uses X as a policy instrument. By choosing to accumulate a higher quantity of reserves
(choosing a large value for X), government can partially compensate for domestic financial ineffi-
ciency (lower value of γH). In addition, based on our assumption of household impatience; steady
state in our model is associated with positive level of borrowing. In other words, in equilibrium, the
country as a whole borrows (Bs) and thereafter pays interest rate R in perpetuity. However, the
economy would not prefer to borrow once the marginal products of capital are equalized R = r+1−δ,
as additional debt would entail a net loss.
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state labor-output and capital-output ratios (expressed in terms of the model param-
eters). Supplementing these with the choice of gross interest rate R = 1.005, financial
and institutional measures γH = 0.5, γX = 0.5, and policy choice X = 10 (Reserves
to GDP ratio) as well as the steady state value of output (Ys), the above equation
can be solved to pin down the value of λs (one equation in one unknown). In turn, we
can substitute the resulting value of λs back into the above steady state expressions
2.5.28 to 2.5.34 to calculate Cs, µs, Qs, Ys, Ks, Is and Ls respectively.[Stepwise details
of the calculations are presented in the appendix.]
Note (from equation 2.5.38) that the value of λs depends critically on the expres-
sion for Bs, given by the product of the two structural parameters (γH and γX) as
well as the choice of X (reserve policy). Other things equal, a higher value of γH
(improvement in financial efficiency) or γX (bond - reserve link) or X (choice of re-
serve holdings) increases the corresponding value of λ. Interestingly enough, due to
the multiplicative nature of the term γHγXX, a variety of combinations are simulta-
neously consistent with a single value of λs. This helps us focus on a wide range of
structural parameters, while still keeping track of a relatively limited set of λ values.
We create a granular grid for γH and γX . Specifically, we consider values of γH
and γX ranging from numbers close to zero (0.001) to scalars greater than equal to
one (up to 5 and 10 respectively). In addition, we examine three distinct choices of
X namely; 2(low), 10(average) and 40(high).29 Based on the three distinct reserve
policy rules and the structural parameter-mix, corresponding series of λs are derived
and in turn, used to calculate the new steady state values of Ys and Cs.
30
A few comparative static results emerging from our numerical experiments war-
rant attention. To begin with, based on the steady state expressions outlined earlier,
29Consider X to be analogous to the reserves to GDP ratio in a country.
30Note that since the capital-output and labor-output ratios are constant in the steady state and
only depend on the model parameters, dynamics of Ks, Is and Ls mimic the behavior of Ys and so
need not be analyzed separately.
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it is clear that output and consumption are positively and negatively related to the
value of λs respectively. Alternatively, as λs rises, so do the steady state values of
Ys, Ks, Is and Ls but on the other hand, Cs falls commensurately. Given the steady
state expression for the aggregate resource constraint, the rise in output is driven by
domestic investment (and private borrowing) as consumption is dampened. These
dynamics (specifically the output growth) are considerably magnified when we tran-
sition from low to high reserve accumulation. Moreover, in the high-reserve scenario
(high X), output rises considerably even for considerably lower values of γH (financial
inefficiency). In addition, the quantitative impact on output and consumption be-
comes more distinguishable and conspicuous as λ becomes considerable large (values
greater than 0.7).31 Table 2.4 in the appendix summarizes the main results of our
comparative statics exercise based on select combinations of γH and γX as well as
three distinct reserve policy choices.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the relationship between institutional quality, financial devel-
opment and reserve accumulation in emerging and developing countries, both from
an empirical and theoretical perspective. Partition-based cluster analysis is used to
capture structural heterogeneities within our sample and identify stylized facts with
regards to foreign reserve dynamics. The cluster outputs indicate the overarching
importance of financial, institutional, and economic variables (going beyond just geo-
graphic separation) to isolate groups of relatively similar countries. Most notably, the
cluster memberships indicate that BRIC countries, newly industrialized Asian giants,
and select Latin American economies occupy the top rung of the reserve ladder. On
31Interestingly enough, several combinations of structural parameters and reserve policy choice
are consistent with a very narrow band of λ ranging from 0.6807 to 0.6985.
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the contrary, more than sixty percent of our sample (countries in Central and Eastern
Europe as well as most of the Latin American and African nations) is concentrated at
the bottom end of the reserve hierarchy. These cluster compositions are quite robust,
based on a battery of sensitivity tests.
In order to further investigate the role of underlying structural heterogeneities
in explaining the reserve accumulation patterns, we undertake a rigorous statistical
inquiry starting with the cross-section regression framework, and then gradually mov-
ing onto a more full-fledged panel data analysis. Income, institutions, openness and
financial development have an important role in explaining cross-national variation
in reserve accumulation. The panel data framework explores cluster-wise as well as
regional heterogeneity by incorporating their interactions with select economic, in-
stitutional and financial measures. In addition, we are also able to explicitly control
for global macroeconomic phenomena influencing the temporal evolution of foreign
reserves.
Our results underscore the vital role played by key economic, institutional and
financial variables in explaining the key patterns of reserve accumulation in the de-
veloping world. The most noteworthy observation is that the effects of these structural
parameters vary considerably by cluster (relatively similar countries) and geography,
not only in terms of their strength but also by direction. While the positive impact of
income (measured by per capital GDP) and certain aspects of financial development
(depth and efficiency of financial system) on reserves is fairly unanimous; the story be-
hind institutional quality (legal, economic) and financial openness (Chinn–Ito Index)
is more complicated and nuanced. Here, a wide range of cluster and region-specific
coefficients exist, varying considerably in strength as well as sign.
In a nutshell, our investigation of foreign reserve dynamics in emerging and de-
veloping nations through the dual lens of cluster and regional grouping culminates
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in several insightful observations at the same time leaving us with some intriguing
puzzles, thus charting the path for future research.
The ongoing debate revolving around the opportunity cost of excessive foreign
reserve holding coupled with fiscal and distortionary financial costs associated with
sterilization has cast serious doubts about the long-term viability of sterilization as an
efficient policy choice. As foreign capital inflows persist and emerging markets con-
tinue to amass foreign exchange reserves, singular reliance on sterilized intervention
is not necessarily sustainable in the long run. Policymakers across the world continue
to face the policy trilemma (the Impossible Trinity) involving exchange rate stability,
monetary sovereignty, and free capital flows while promoting economic growth. As
capital account liberalization deepens and gains momentum in the developing world,
volatile foreign capital flows are bound to challenge the relatively underdeveloped and
vulnerable domestic financial systems. The most pertinent policy prescription seems
to warrant greater freedom and flexibility in policy choices coupled with strengthening
the domestic financial architecture.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Derivation of the Optimality Conditions from the Base-
line Model
We solve the household’s optimization problem by setting up the Lagrangian, in-
corporating the period budget constraint as well as the borrowing constraint.
L = [ln Ct−Ltη
η
]+λt[wtLt+rtKt+QtHt+Bt−Ct−Kt+1+(1−δ)Kt−Ht+1−RBt−1]+
µt[γHHt−Bt]+βEt[lnCt+1− Lt+1η
η
]+βEtλt+1[wt+1Lt+1+rt+1Kt+1+Qt+1Ht+1+Bt+1−
Ct+1 −Kt+2 + (1− δ)Kt+1 −Ht+2 −RBt] + βEtµt+1[γHHt+1 −Bt+1] + .....
Differentiating with respect to the decision variables Ct, Lt, Kt+1, Ht+1,and Bt
yield to the following five order conditions:
1
Ct
= λt (2.7.1)
−Lη−1t + λtwt = 0⇒ Lη−1t =
wt
Ct
(2.7.2)
−λt + βEtλt+1[rt+1 + (1− δ)] = 0⇒ 1
Ct
= βEt
1
Ct+1
[rt+1 + (1− δ)] (2.7.3)
−λt + βEtλt+1Qt+1 + βγHEtµt+1 ⇒ 1
Ct
− βEt 1
Ct+1
Qt+1 = βγHEtµt+1 (2.7.4)
λt − µt − βREtλt+1 ⇒ λt − µt = βREtλt+1 ⇒ 1
Ct
+ βREt
1
Ct+1
= µt (2.7.5)
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2.7.2 Steady State Calculations
Using the Production Function Yt = AtK
1−α
t L
α
t we can derive the expressions for
Ks
Ls
and Ys
Ls
as follows:
Ys
Ks
= Kα−1s L
1−α
s ⇒
Ys
Ks
= [
Ks
Ls
]α−1 = [
1− β + βδ
αβ
] (2.7.6)
Therefore:
Ks
Ls
= [
Ys
Ks
]
1
α−1 (2.7.7)
Ys
Ls
=
Ys
Ks
∗ Ks
Ls
⇒ [ Ys
Ks
]
α
α−1 = [
1− β + βδ
αβ
]
α
α−1 (2.7.8)
Firm’s optimality conditions imply the following expressions for factor prices:
ws = (1− α) YsLs ; and rs = α YsKs
Plugging in the the expressions for Y
L
and Y
K
yields:
ws = (1− α)[1− β + βδ
αβ
]
α
α−1 (2.7.9)
rs = α[
1− β + βδ
αβ
] = [
1− β + βδ
β
] (2.7.10)
The labor-leisure trade-off at the steady state implies:
Lηs = (1− α)λYs ⇒ Ls = [(1− α)λYs]
1
η = (wλ)
1
η−1 (2.7.11)
We can use the above expressions for steady state labor supply, wage, and rental
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rate to solve for the steady state value of output and capital.
1
Cs
= λ⇒ Cs = 1
λs
(2.7.12)
1
Cs
= β[
1
Cs
(r + 1− δ)]⇒ 1
β
= (r + 1− δ) (2.7.13)
We have assumed R < 1
β
. Therefore we have, R < 1
β
< (r + 1− δ)
(λs − µs) = βRλs ⇒ βR = λs − µs
λs
< 1⇒ λs − µs < λs ⇒ µs > 0 (2.7.14)
λs − βλsQs = βµsγH ⇒ Qs = λs − βµsγH
βλs
=
1
β
[1− βµsγH
λs
] (2.7.15)
For reasonable parameter values of (β, λ, µ, and γH); the above inequality implies
that Q < 1
β
.
β(r + 1− δ) = 1⇒ α Ys
Ks
+ 1− δ = 1
β
⇒ Ys
Ks
= [
1− β + βδ]
αβ
] (2.7.16)
Ys =
Lηs
(1− α)λs =
(wsλ)
η
η−1
(1− α)λs =
[(1− α) Ys
Ls
λs]
η
η−1
(1− α)λs (2.7.17)
Therefore:
Ys = (1− α)
1
η−1λ
1
η−1
s [
1− β + βδ
αβ
]
αη
(α−1)(η−1) (2.7.18)
And using the steady state value of output Ys we get:
Ls = [(1− α)λsYs]
1
η = (wsλs)
1
η−1 (2.7.19)
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Ks = [
αβ
1− β + βδ ]Ys (2.7.20)
The law of motion for capital stock reduces to the following expression for steady
state investment:
Is = δKs (2.7.21)
2.7.3 Numerical Steady State and Comparative Statics
As a reference point for our steady state calculations, we begin with the following
values of model parameters and reserve policy choice:
α = 0.3, β = 0.99, δ = 0.05, η = 4
R = 1.005, γH = 0.5, γX = 0.5, X = 10
In order to arrive at the steady state value of λs, we focus on the steady state
equivalent of the aggregate resource constraint and substitute the relevant steady
state expressions. Therefore we have:
Ys[1− δ( αβ
1− β + βδ )] =
1
λs
+ (R− 1)γHγXXs (2.7.22)
Plugging in the benchmark parameter values results in the following equation.
1.67λ0.33s =
1
λs
+ 0.0125 (2.7.23)
Solving the above equation yields λs = 0.6851. Now, we go back the steady state
expressions derived earlier and calculate their numerical values based on this specific
value of λs.
λs = 0.6851, µs = (1− βR)λs = 0.0035
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Important steady state ratios are calculated as follows:
Ys
Ks
= 0.2003
Ks
Ls
= 9.9449
Ys
Ls
= 1.9920
Steady state values for factor prices (wages and rental rate) are:
ws = (1− α) YsLs = 1.3944, rs = α YsKs = 0.0601
Finally, steady state levels of key variables are computed as below:
Cs = 1/λs = 1.4597
Ys = (1− α)
1
η−1 (λs)
1
η−1 [ Ys
Ls
]
η
η−1 = 1.9618
Ks = [
αβ
1−β+βδ ]Ys = 9.7944
Is = δKs = 0.4897
Ls = (wsλs)
1
η−1 = 0.9849
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Table 2.4: Comparative Statics under Different Reserve Choices  
        X = 2 γ_h  γ_x  λ Y_2 C_2 I_2 
 
 
0.001 0.001 0.6807 1.95743 1.46908 0.48862 
 
 
1 1 0.6842 1.96078 1.46156 0.48946 
 
 
1 5 0.6985 1.97435 1.43164 0.49285 
 
 
1 10 0.717 1.99162 1.3947 0.49716 
 
 
5 5 0.7777 2.0463 1.28584 0.51081 
 
 
5 10 0.8993 2.14782 1.11198 0.53615 
 
 
       X = 10 γ_h  γ_x  λ Y_10 C_10 I_10 
 
 
0.001 0.5 0.6807 1.95743 1.46908 0.48862 
 
 
0.5 0.5 0.6851 1.96164 1.45964 0.48967 
 
 
0.5 10 0.7777 2.0463 1.28584 0.51081 
 
 
1 10 0.8993 2.14782 1.11198 0.53615 
 
 
5 5 1.5058 2.55042 0.6641 0.63665 
 
 
5 10 4.3649 3.63635 0.2291 0.90772 
 
 
       
        X = 40 γ_h  γ_x  λ Y_40 C_40 I_40 
 
 
0.001 0.001 0.6807 1.95743 1.46908 0.48862 
 
 
0.5 1 0.717 1.99162 1.3947 0.49716 
 
 
0.5 5 0.8993 2.14782 1.11198 0.53615 
 
 
1 10 2.8084 3.13931 0.35607 0.78365 
 
 
5 5 27.4389 6.71073 0.03644 1.67517 
 
 
5 10 215.124 13.3305 0.00465 3.32764 
  
Note: The first two columns in each of the panels represent different combinations of structural 
parameters γ_h and γ_x and the corresponding steady state value of λ. The remaining three columns trace 
the dynamics of output, consumption, and investment based on their steady state expressions derived 
earlier.  
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MIDDLE 
EAST & 
AFRICA
Bangladesh BN Argentina AR Albania AL Egypt EG
China CH Bolivia BO Armenia AM Jordan JO
Hong Kong HK Brazil BR Belarus BL Morocco MO
India IN Chile CL Bulgaria BU Nigeria NG
Indonesia IS Colombia CO Latvia LV South Africa SA
Malaysia ML Costa Rica CR Lithuania LI
Nepal NP Ecuador EC Poland PO
Pakistan PK El Salvador EL Romania RO
Phillipines PH Guatemala GU Russia RU
Thailand TH Mexico MX Turkey TK
Korea KO Panama PN Ukraine UR
Singapore SG Paraguay PG
Sri Lanka SL Peru PR
Uruguay UG
Venezuela VZ
CENTRAL & 
EASTERN 
EUROPELATIN AMERICAASIA
Country Sample , by Geography
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Cluster # 1 2 3 4 5
AL CH AR BR IS
AM CL HK ML
BL CO IN MX
BN EG KO PO
BO MO RS TH
BU NG SG TK
CR PH
EC PR
EL RO
GU SA
JO UR
LI VZ
LV
NP
PG
PK
PN
SL
UG
Size 19 1 12 6 6
R Foreign Reserves ($mn)
Ygr Average annual GDP growth rate
CI Chinn-Ito Index of financial openness
 Cluster Analysis - Snapshot 1
1995-2010 [N=44]
Variable Included in the Kmeans algorithm
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Cluster # 1 2 3 4 Cluster # 1 2 3 4 5
AR CH BR AM BR AM CH AR IS
IS IN BN IN BN CL ML
ML KO BO KO BO CO MX
MX RS BU RS BU EG PO
PO SG CL SG CR MO TH
TH CO EC NG TK
TK CR EL PH
EC GU PR
EG JO RO
EL LI SA
GU LV UR
JO PG VZ
LI PK
LV PN
MO SL
NG UG
PG Size 5 16 1 12 6
PH
PK
PN R Foreign Reserves ($mn)
PR PCY Per Capital GDP
RO Ygr Average annual GDP growth (%)
SA Leg Legal
SL Pol Political
UG Eco Economic
UR CI Chinn-Ito Index of Financial Openness
VZ PrCr Private Credit to GDP Ratio(%)
Size 7 1 5 27 NetInt Net Interest Margin
BankZ Bank Z score
StockCap Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio(%)
 (K = 4) 1995-2010   (K = 5) 1995-2010
Cluster Analysis - Snapshot 2
  Variable Included in the Kmeans algorithm
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# 1 2 3 4 # 1 2 3 4  # 1 2 3 4
BR AR BN CH CH AR BR IN IS CH AR BR
IN CO BO SG AM IS KO ML AM IN
KO EG BU BN ML RS MX BN KO
ML IS CR BO MX SG PO BO RS
MX PH EC BU PO TH BU SG
TH PO EL CO TH TK CL
PR GU CR TK CO
RS JO EC CR
TK LI EG EC
LV EL EG
MO JO EL
NG LI JO
PG LV LV
PK MO LI
PN NG MO
RO PK NG
SA PN PK
SL PG PN
UG PR PG
UR PH PR
RO PH
SA RO
SL SA
UR SL
UG UR
UG
Size 6 9 20 2 Size 1 25 7 4 Size 6 1 26 5
R Foreign Reserves ($mn)
PCY Per Capital GDP
Ygr Average annual GDP growth(%)
Leg Legal
Pol Political
Eco Economic
CI Chinn-Ito Index of Financial Openness
PrCr Private Credit to GDP Ratio(%)
NetInt Net Interest Margin
BankZ Bank Z score
StockCap Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio(%)
Variable Included in the Kmeans algorithm
 1995-2000 [N=37]   2001-2005 [N=37]  2006-2010 [N=38]
Cluster Analysis by Five Year Time Windows - Snapshot 3
103
# 1 2 3 4 # 1 2 3 4
CH CR AR BN AM IS BR CH
SG LV BR BO AR ML IN
LI EG BU BN MX KO
PN IN CO BO PO RS
SA IS EC BU TH SG
UG KO EL CL TK
ML GU CO
MX JO CR
PO MO EC
RS NG EG
TH PK EL
TK PG JO
PR LI
PH LV
RO MO
SL NG
UR PG
PH
PK
PN
PR
RO
SA
SL
UG
UR
VZ
Size 2 6 12 17 Size 27 6 5 1
R Foreign Reserves ($mn)
PCY Per Capital GDP
Ygr Average annual GDP growth (%)
Leg Legal
Pol Political
Eco Economic
CI Chinn-Ito Index of Financial Openness
PrCr Private Credit to GDP Ratio(%)
NetInt Net Interest Margin
BankZ Bank Z score
StockCap Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio(%)
1990-2000 [N= 37] 2000-2010 [N=39]
Cluster Analysis by Decades - Snapshot 4
  Variable Included in the Kmeans algorithm
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Leg 43 -0.31 0.63 -1.21 1.31
Pol 42 -0.07 0.62 -1.21 0.98
Eco 42 -0.16 0.72 -1.47 1.80
PCY 44 4649.51 5699.54 290.98 27989.80
PCYgr 44 3.19 1.75 0.66 9.14
Ygr 44 4.33 1.50 1.51 9.93
R 44 48212.79 125180.30 738.55 811339.00
RY 44 18.32 15.95 4.27 91.88
CI 44 0.44 1.30 -1.33 2.44
PrCr 44 43.91 35.88 4.59 150.51
FinDep 44 44.20 37.89 4.64 229.66
NetInt 44 4.76 2.12 1.72 11.60
BankZ 44 15.03 11.32 -1.40 43.08
StockCap 42 46.26 66.59 0.64 355.24
StockTurn 42 42.31 55.74 0.96 220.10
Note: Variable Desctription
Leg Legal
Pol Political
Eco Economic
PCY Per Capital GDP
PCYgr Average annual Growth rate of GDP per capita
Ygr Average annual GDP growth
R Foreign Reserves ($mn)
RY Reserves to GDP ratio (%)
CI Chinn-Ito Index of Financial Openness
PrCr Private Credit to GDP Ratio
FinDep Financial System deposits to GDP ratio
NetInt Net Interest Margin
BankZ Bank Z score
StockCap Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio
StockTurn Stock markte turnover to GDP ratio
Institutional Quality
Income and Growth
Reserve Accumulation
Financial Development
Descriptive Statistics
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Cluster # N R PCY Ygr CI
1 19 2811.95 2789.15 4.43 0.87
2 1 811339.00 1731.56 9.93 -1.17
3 12 17257.54 3416.42 3.74 0.06
4 6 126682.10 13351.60 4.61 0.40
5 6 48235.62 4791.03 4.00 0.14
Cluster # N R PCY Ygr CI
1 7 45205.43 5054.99 3.93 0.15
2 1 811339.00 1731.56 9.93 -1.17
3 5 125926.90 10635.78 4.82 -0.01
4 27 8501.24 3046.01 4.05 0.73
The top panel includes all the countries (44) but a smaller subset of variables (R,Ygr, CI).
The bottom panel covers 40 countries and is based on a extended variable set covering 
reserves, income, growth, institutional quality, financial opneness, and financial development.
Note: Variable Desctription
R Foreign Reserves ($mn)
PCY Per Capital GDP
Ygr Average annual GDP growth
CI Chinn-Ito Index of Financial Openness
 Reserves, Economic Growth & Financial Openness,  
Cluster-averages [1995-2010]
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Leg Pol Eco PCY Ygr CI PrCr FinDep NetInt BankZ StCap StTurn
    Leg    1.00
Pol 0.85 1.00
Eco 0.70 0.73 1.00
PCY 0.60 0.71 0.62 1.00
Ygr 0.19 -0.08 0.12 -0.20 1.00
CI 0.22 0.32 0.69 0.29 0.08 1.00
PrCr 0.51 0.22 0.19 0.09 0.31 -0.11 1.00
FinDep 0.43 0.17 0.13 0.06 0.35 -0.05 0.82 1.00
NetInt -0.42 -0.16 -0.13 -0.11 -0.52 0.00 -0.69 -0.65 1.00
BankZ 0.20 0.11 0.23 -0.01 0.24 0.11 0.29 0.40 -0.13 1.00
StCap 0.39 0.12 0.08 0.18 0.28 -0.23 0.63 0.63 -0.56 0.40 1.00
StTurn 0.23 -0.08 -0.20 0.03 0.33 -0.51 0.38 0.48 -0.52 0.01 0.62 1.00
Note: Shaded cells denote statistically significant pairwise correlations.
Rank Correlation Matrix for Economic, Institutional and Financial Variables 
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 Table 2.3a: Regional Heterogeneity I: Income and Reserve Accumulation 
 
 Reserves(log) 
Africa#PCGDP 1.42*** 
 (0.14) 
  
Asia#PCGDP 1.17*** 
 (0.09) 
  
CEE#PCGDP 1.12*** 
 (0.06) 
  
LatAm#PCGDP 0.66*** 
 (0.09) 
  
MENA#PCGDP 0.84*** 
 (0.16) 
  
Time1: 1995-2000     0.44*** 
 (0.05) 
  
Time2: 2001-2005 0.80*** 
 (0.05) 
  
Time3: 2006-2010 1.09*** 
 (0.08) 
Observations 869 
   Standard errors in parentheses 
   * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Note: Dependent variable is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are interactions of five regional 
dummies with per capita income (log). The last three rows correspond to the time dummies for each of the five-year 
windows namely; 1995-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 to capture the impact of global macroeconomic events 
(common for the entire sample) on reserve accumulation. 
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 Table 2.3b: Regional Heterogeneity II: Financial Openness and Reserve Accumulation 
 
 Reserves(log) 
Africa#FinOpen Index 0.49*** 
 (0.14) 
  
Asia#FinOpen Index 0.19*** 
 (0.07) 
  
CEE#FinOpen Index 0.27*** 
 (0.05) 
  
LatAm#FinOpen Index -0.05* 
 (0.03) 
  
MENA#FinOpen Index -0.05 
 (0.05) 
  
Time1: 1995-2000 0.67*** 
 (0.05) 
  
Time2: 2001-2005 1.21*** 
 (0.06) 
  
Time3: 2006-2010 2.08*** 
 (0.06) 
Observations 863 
   Standard errors in parentheses 
   * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are interactions of five regional 
dummies with the Chinn Ito index (proxy for financial openness). The last three rows correspond to the time 
dummies for each of the five-year windows namely; 1995-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 to capture the impact of 
global macroeconomic events (common for the entire sample) on reserve accumulation. 
 
 
. 
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 Table 2.3c: Regional Heterogeneity III: Legal Institutions and Reserve Accumulation 
 
 
 Reserves(log) 
Africa#Inst-Legal 0.72*** 
 (0.22) 
  
Asia#Inst-Legal 0.12 
 (0.09) 
  
CEE#Inst-Legal -1.26*** 
 (0.19) 
  
LatAm#Inst-Legal 0.46*** 
 (0.07) 
  
MENA#Inst-Legal -0.54** 
 (0.24) 
  
Time1: 1995-2000 0.73*** 
 (0.05) 
  
Time2: 2001-2005 1.29*** 
 (0.06) 
  
Time3: 2006-2010 2.20*** 
 (0.06) 
Observations 807 
      Standard errors in parentheses 
      * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are interactions of five regional 
dummies with quality of legal institutions in a country relative to others. The last three rows correspond to the time 
dummies for each of the five-year windows namely; 1995-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 to capture the impact of 
global macroeconomic events (common for the entire sample) on reserve accumulation. 
 
. 
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 Table 2.3d: Regional Heterogeneity IV: Economic Institutions and Reserve Accumulation 
 
 
 Reserves(log) 
Africa#Inst-Economic 0.76 
 (0.49) 
  
Asia#Inst-Economic 0.01 
 (0.11) 
  
CEE#Inst-Economic 0.90*** 
 (0.16) 
  
LatAm#Inst-Economic 0.34*** 
 (0.06) 
  
MENA#Inst-Economic 0.44** 
 (0.17) 
  
Time1: 1995-2000 0.68*** 
 (0.05) 
  
Time2: 2001-2005 1.28*** 
 (0.06) 
  
Time3: 2006-2010 2.16*** 
 (0.06) 
Observations 805 
      Standard errors in parentheses 
      * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are interactions of five regional 
dummies with quality of economic institutions in a country relative to others. The last three rows correspond to the 
time dummies for each of the five-year windows namely; 1995-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 to capture the 
impact of global macroeconomic events (common for the entire sample) on reserve accumulation. 
 
. 
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 Table 2.3e: Regional Heterogeneity V: Private Credit to GDP and Reserve Accumulation 
 
 
 Reserves(log) 
Africa#PrCr to GDP 1.10*** 
 (0.22) 
  
Asia#PrCr to GDP 0.56*** 
 (0.12) 
  
CEE#PrCr to GDP 0.52*** 
 (0.06) 
  
LatAm#PrCr to GDP 0.06 
 (0.09) 
  
MENA#PrCr to GDP -0.21 
 (0.25) 
  
Time1: 1995-2000 0.65*** 
 (0.06) 
  
Time2: 2001-2005 1.17*** 
 (0.06) 
  
Time3: 2006-2010 1.95*** 
 (0.06) 
Observations 814 
      Standard errors in parentheses 
      * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are interactions of five regional 
dummies with ratio of private credit to GDP (log). The last three rows correspond to the time dummies for each of 
the five-year windows namely; 1995-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 to capture the impact of global 
macroeconomic events (common for the entire sample) on reserve accumulation. 
 
 
. 
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 Table 2.3f: Regional Heterogeneity VI: Total Deposits to GDP and Reserve Accumulation 
 
 
 Reserves(log) 
Africa#Dep-GDP Ratio 1.13*** 
 (0.26) 
  
Asia#Dep-GDP Ratio 1.09*** 
 (0.14) 
  
CEE#Dep-GDP Ratio 1.10*** 
 (0.10) 
  
LatAm#Dep-GDP Ratio 0.37*** 
 (0.10) 
  
MENA#Dep-GDP Ratio 0.62 
 (0.41) 
  
Time1: 1995-2000 0.57*** 
 (0.05) 
  
Time2: 2001-2005 0.98*** 
 (0.06) 
  
Time3: 2006-2010 1.74*** 
 (0.06) 
Observations 821 
     Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Note: Dependent variable is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are interactions of five regional 
dummies with total financial system deposits to GDP ratio (log). The last three rows correspond to the time 
dummies for each of the five-year windows namely; 1995-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 to capture the impact of 
global macroeconomic events (common for the entire sample) on reserve accumulation. 
 
 
. 
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Table 2.3g: Regional Heterogeneity VII: Stock Market Capitalization and Reserves 
 
 
 Reserves(log) 
Africa#StockCap-Y  0.86*** 
 (0.15) 
  
Asia#StockCap-Y  0.37*** 
 (0.06) 
  
CEE#StockCap-Y 0.20*** 
 (0.03) 
  
LatAM#StockCap-Y -0.04 
 (0.05) 
  
MENA#StockCap-Y -0.03 
 (0.07) 
  
Time1: 1995-2000 0.60*** 
 (0.06) 
  
Time2: 2001-2005 1.11*** 
 (0.07) 
  
Time3: 2006-2010 1.90*** 
 (0.08) 
Observations 698 
      Standard errors in parentheses. 
      * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are interactions of five regional 
dummies with the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (log). The last three rows correspond to the time 
dummies for each of the five-year windows namely; 1995-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 to capture the impact of 
global macroeconomic events (common for the entire sample) on reserve accumulation. 
 
 
. 
 
114
 Table 2.3h: Regional Heterogeneity VIII: Stock Market Turnover and Reserves 
 
 
 Reserves(log) 
Africa#StockTurnover 0.41*** 
 (0.07) 
  
Asia#StockTurnover  0.19*** 
 (0.05) 
  
CEE#StockTurnover -0.07 
 (0.04) 
  
LatAm#StockTurnover 0.14*** 
 (0.04) 
  
MENA#StockTurnover -0.10 
 (0.08) 
  
Time1: 1995-2000 0.63*** 
 (0.06) 
  
Time2: 2001-2005 1.19*** 
 (0.06) 
  
Time 3: 2006-2010 2.07*** 
 (0.06) 
Observations 686 
      Standard errors in parentheses. 
      * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is Reserves minus gold (log). The explanatory variables are interactions of five regional 
dummies with the stock market turnover ratio (log). The last three rows correspond to the time dummies for each of 
the five-year windows namely; 1995-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 to capture the impact of global 
macroeconomic events (common for the entire sample) on reserve accumulation. 
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Figure 2.1a: Economic Growth and Reserve Accumulation: Full Sample
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Figure 2.1b: Openness, Institutions and Reserve Accumulation: Full Sample
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Figure 2.2a: GDP Growth and Relative Reserve Share: Five Year averages
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Figure 2.2b: GDP Growth and Relative Reserve Share: Five Year and Decade-
averages
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Figure 2.3a: GDP Growth and Reserve Accumulation: Five Year averages
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Figure 2.3b: GDP Growth and Reserve Accumulation: Five Year and Decade-
averages
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Figure 2.4a: Financial Openness and Reserve Accumulation: Five Year averages
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Figure 2.4b: Financial Openness and Reserve Accumulation: Five Year and Decade-
averages
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Figure 2.5a: Legal Institutions and Reserve Dynamics: Five Year averages
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Figure 2.5b: Legal Institutions and Reserve Dynamics: Five Year and Decade-
averages
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Figure 2.6a: Economic Institutions and Reserve Dynamics: Five Year averages
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Figure 2.6b: Economic Institutions and Reserve Dynamics: Five Year and Decade-
averages
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Figure 2.7a: Financial Institution Depth and Reserve Accumulation
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Figure 2.7b: Financial Institution Efficiency, Stability and Reserve Accumulation
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Figure 2.7c: Financial Market Depth, Efficiency and Reserve Accumulation
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